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Chapter 1  - Introduction 
 
One of the key issues in public finance concerns optimal jurisdiction size. The size of a 
national government is in many cases too large for efficient delivery of public services. 
Through decentralization the national government can decide about which services it will 
deliver itself, and which are to be delivered at a lower government level. But its discretion to 
set policy is not limited to the selection of a particular level of government and the typical 
size that comes with that level of government. The size of lower level governments is not set 
in stone, and through restructuring the national government has alternative instruments to 
influence the size of both administration and of public service delivery. In fact, in some 
countries local governments can decide for themselves to engage in restructuring 
procedures. 
1.1 Local government size in practice 
Two developments have triggered studies that form the basis for this thesis: the existing and 
persisting differences in local government size between countries, and the intensified 
involvement of the Dutch national government in issues regarding the size of municipal 
service delivery.   
International comparison 
There is a large variation in the population size of local governments (or municipalities) 
between countries. Average municipality size varies remarkably (Hoorens, 2008; Warner, 
2006): it is low in the Czech Republic (1,640 inhabitants) and France (1,720) and high in the 
UK (140,000). Average population size is 7,400 in the USA and 5,400 in the EU-countries. 
These large differences might provoke a quick conclusion that there is no consensus on an 
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optimal size for local government, but that would ignore the role of historical factors in the 
existence of these differences. The current state of local jurisdictions may largely be the 
result of historical developments in the field of public administration and not so much the 
outcome of recent policies. 
At the same time, even a quick scan of recent local government restructuring operations 
paints a picture of large variation. For example, a nationwide amalgamation operation in 
Belgium reduced the number of municipalities in 1977 from 2,359 to 596 (De Ceuninck et al., 
2010) resulting in an average population size of 16.5 thousand. In Finland the number of 
municipalities has been reduced by one fourth in less then ten years since the national 
government launched a municipal reform campaign in 2006 (Kettunen, 2015), leading to 320 
municipalities of on average 17 thousand inhabitants. In Denmark, a structural reform of 
local government resulted in the amalgamation of 271 municipalities into 98 new ones in 
2007 (Blom-Hansen et al., 2012), which on average had 55.6 thousand inhabitants. In 
Sweden there have even been two municipal reform operations; the first one in 1952 
reduced the number of municipalities from 2,498 to 1,037, while the second one led to a 
further reduction of the number of municipalities to 278 (average population size 29.3 
thousand) by the year 1974 (Hanes, 2014). 
Hence, not only are there large differences in the average size of local governments in 
general, but also in the average size of municipalities resulting from various restructuring 
operations. The average size in different countries does not appear to converge to a certain 
population range. 
Policy in the Netherlands 
In the Netherlands, amalgamations have occurred on a very regular basis for a long period of 
time. Almost every year some municipalities have amalgamated, leading to a reduction of 
the number of municipalities from 1,121 in the year 1900 to 393 in 2015. Until 2002, local 
public support in municipalities that were to be amalgamated was formally not taken into 
account by the national government in its proposals for amalgamations to the House of 
Representatives. This changed when the Balkenende administration explicitly stated that 
broad public support in the affected municipalities would be valued as a highly important 
factor in the decision to propose an amalgamation.1 In policy proposals since then, the 
initiative for amalgamatiosn has lied with the municipalities involved, or with the provinces 
in cases where an amalgamation is deemed necessary, under the condition that the 
preferences of municipalities are taken into account as much as possible.  
Although the national government is formally responsible for any boundary reforms, it has 
been known – until recently – to hold back on imposing or pushing for amalgamation plans 
for lower levels of government. The instalment of the Rutte II administration in 2012 marked 
                                                        
1 Beleidskader gemeentelijke herindeling, Parliamentary papers,28 750, Nr. 1, December 18th, 2002. 
Introduction  3 
 
a change in the policy stance of the national government on the arrangement of local 
government. In the coalition agreement of this administration2, one of the long term 
ambitions in the area of public administration was that municipalities should be increased in 
size. This was deemed necessary because the same administration was planning on 
decentralizing a number of important tasks in the fields of (youth) care and employment 
from the national government to municipalities. The complexity of those tasks and the 
expertise that was required to fulfill those tasks were expected to make it hard if not 
impossible for small municipalities to carry them out in an adequate manner.  
As a numerical guideline, a minimum population size of 100,000 was stated (whereas the 
average population of a municipality at the time was a little over 40,000), although this 
number would not be upheld in a strict manner in lesser populated areas of the country. 
Minister Plasterk of Interior and Kingdom Relations later stated that this ambition meant 
striving for a doubling of the number of amalgamations each year. As one of the means to 
achieve this, the amalgamation policy with regard to the role of the provinces (regional 
governments) was changed in 2013. In the new national policy for municipal 
amalgamations3, provinces were allowed to take the initiative for amalgamating 
municipalities if they deemed this necessary to ensure an adequate quality of local 
government and if the bottom-up process did not progress sufficiently. 
The ambition of decentralizing tasks to municipalities and scaling up the municipalities was 
linked to a reduction of the municipality fund, a fund used for the distribution of money 
from the national government to municipalities. In the long term, this reduction would 
gradually build up to a structural amount of 975 million euros per year, approximately 6% of 
the total size of the municipality fund per 2012. This number was based only on a general 
remark on the expected economies of size, reduced supervision, simplification of regulations 
and a reduction of redundant tasks as a result of the scaling up of municipalities.  
An operation aimed at decentralization of three government tasks in the social domain to 
municipalities (taking up 18 billion euros in annual government spending) was also included 
in the coalition agreement, and it was stated that these decentralizations were ‘in principal 
aimed at 100,000+ municipalities’4. Although the numerical criterion of a minimum of 
100,000 inhabitants was later on declared by the minister to be a long-term directive more 
than a demand5, and as a result there appeared to be less emphasis on amalgamations to 
comply with this criterion, the complexity of the decentralized tasks did put pressure on 
smaller municipalities to either find suitable amalgamation partners, or to engage in 
intermunicipal cooperation. 
                                                        
2 Bruggen slaan, Coalition agreement VVD – PvdA, October 29th, 2012. 
3 Beleidskader gemeentelijke herindeling, Parliamentary papers, 28 750, Nr. 53, May 28th, 2013. 
4 Bruggen slaan, Coalition agreement VVD – PvdA, October 29th, 2012. 
5 Decentralisatiebrief, Parliamentary papers,33 400 VII, Nr. 59, February 19th, 2013. 
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While the Dutch situation illustrates that restructuring operations have occurred, partly out 
of efficiency related motivations, the international differences in the size of local 
governments imply that no clear idea exists on an optimal size. Economic research could 
play an important role in the debate on this topic, both in theoretical and in empirical form. 
1.2 The theory on optimal size 
The first question to be raised is how the optimal size of local governments should be 
determined. A standard approach here, as in most fields of economics, is to aim for an 
optimization of efficiency, leading to a maximization of utility. From a national point of view, 
the relevant measure of utility is the total utility created for all of its inhabitants by their 
respective local governments. This is of course under the condition that these local 
governments do not interfere with the effort to maximize utility by the national government 
itself. 
We distinguish two types of efficiency, productive efficiency and allocative efficiency, each 
of which are affected in different ways by the size of the local government. 
Productive efficiency 
Productive efficiency has its origins in the works of classical economists such as Adam Smith, 
and concerns the question of how a certain production unit (in our case the local 
government) can maximize output at given inputs, or minimize the inputs needed to 
produce a given output.  
There are a number of channels through which a larger size may increase this type of 
efficiency. Smith introduces division of labour and specialization, which are closely related 
mechanisms. Specialization is related to how broad an individual worker’s task is. He states 
that the smaller the task of an individual worker is (and thus the more times he is able to 
repeat that task in a given time period), the more proficient he will become in that task. 
Consequently, assigning more people to a certain set of tasks, allowing them to split up 
these sets of tasks into smaller sets per individual, will lead to a higher degree of 
specialization.  
In the context of local governments, the idea is that officials working for smaller 
municipalities can not be occupied full time by certain tasks. As a result, they will be 
assigned a broader set of tasks, but since they only work on each of these tasks for a limited 
time, they will not become fully proficient. In larger municipalities, it is possible to have 
officials working on limited tasks full time, allowing them to specialize and as a result 
increase their individual proficiency and with that the efficiency of their department as a 
whole.  
A second mechanism that results in economies of size is the existence of certain costs that 
do not increase proportionally with the size of the municipality. When a municipality 
doubles in size, for instance, it is not expected that size of the city offices will double, and 
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neither does the number of elected politicians, typically. This has led proponents of 
municipal mergers to being convinced that larger jurisdictions will lead to economies of size 
in service production as well as lower administrative expenditures (Oates 1985, King 1984). 
Thirdly, larger jurisdictions have greater bargaining power with regard to the acquisition of 
goods and services from private suppliers, allowing them to lower their purchase prices 
(Dollery and Fleming 2006). A fourth positive effect is that the chances of random events 
affecting the re-election of politicians are smaller. Assuming that these random events 
happen with the same frequency and affect the same number of voters, the share of voters 
affected by these events is smaller because the total number of voters is larger. The smaller 
impact of random events means that accountability mechanisms in general are enforced 
(Kessing 2010).  
Productive efficiency can also be negatively affected by the occurrence of certain 
diseconomies of size. Unit costs of production might rise if an organization exceeds a certain 
size due to reduced managerial capabilities in terms of higher coordination and 
communication costs (Coase 1937). In terms of local government, each official involved in 
translating voters’ preferences into public services has his own preference function, which 
results in increasing levels of noise in this process and thus in more inefficiency. Additionally, 
information transmission costs will grow with the size of the municipal organization. These 
costs might grow linearly and possibly even exponentially with organization size (Tullock 
1969). When looking for a more specific definition of these officials’ preference functions, 
one important theory is that bureaucrats take advantage of information asymmetries in 
order to maximize budgets and slack, above efficient levels (Niskanen 1971, Wyckof 1990). 
The larger the municipal organization, the larger the number of levels at which these 
information asymmetries can be found. 
An increase in size can also negatively affect productive efficiency indirectly. Assuming a 
fixed national population, the number of local jurisdictions decreases when their average 
size increases. As a means of evaluating local government performance, inhabitants may 
engage in comparing the performance of their own government with that in other 
jurisdictions. Since these comparisons make inefficiency more apparent to the voters, this 
stimulates local governments to reduce inefficiency, engaging in so called yardstick 
competition. However, as the number of jurisdictions decreases, this mechanism is 
weakened, since there are less local governments to compare with (Allers 2012), and 
probably less local governments that have similar characteristics. 
To summarize, productive efficiency can be affected both positively and negatively by 
increasing size of the municipality.  
Allocative efficiency 
Full allocative efficiency is attained when actual production exactly matches consumers’ 
preferences, or in the governmental context when the total of public services (including 
provision of public goods) delivered by the government matches the preferences of the 
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inhabitants. Allocative efficiency can be influenced both negatively and positively by an 
increase of size of local government. 
A direct negative consequence of larger jurisdictions is that the possibilities for inhabitants 
to change local policy through voting are limited. Firstly, larger jurisdictions allow for larger 
informational advantages of politicians over the voters, making it easier for them to pursue 
selfish goals that are not in line with maximizing social welfare (Oates 2005). Even if some 
voters are able to correctly evaluate the performance of politicians, the influence of this 
group of knowledgeable voters is relatively small in larger municipalities, weakening 
governance mechanisms that increase allocative efficiency (Lassen and Serritzlew 2011).  
Oates’ decentralization theorem states that tasks should be decentralized as long as the 
benefits outweigh the costs (Oates 1972). In his view, the costs are caused firstly by the fact 
that any cost savings induced by centralization (discussed in our section on productive 
efficiency) are consequently reduced when tasks are decentralized, and secondly by 
interjurisdictional externalities (which we will discuss below). The benefits mainly stem from 
the fact that each local government is (to a nationally set degree) free to choose which 
public services to deliver (and at what quality) and by doing that it is able to match the 
preferences of the inhabitants more closely. Assuming a variation in the preferences of 
inhabitants, the average degree to which local policies match the preferences of the 
inhabitants will decrease with the size of the jurisdiction.  
There are also negative consequences that we classify as indirect, since they are not caused 
directly by the larger size of jurisdictions but are instead a consequence of the smaller 
number of jurisdictions. Tiebout (1956) states that people - in addition to voting for 
politicians that match their preferences - can choose to go live in a jurisdiction where local 
policy best suits their preferences. It follows that the variation in local policies to choose 
from decreases if the number of jurisdictions is reduced. In other words, the less 
jurisdictions there are for a person to choose from, the larger the minimum attainable 
difference is between his own preferences and the public services delivered by the best 
matching jurisdiction. Hence, an increased jurisdiction size reduces allocative efficiency. 
There is also an important theoretical advantage to a larger size for jurisdictions, being the 
reduction of spillover effects. When a local government decides on offering a certain public 
service, it is assumed to only (or mainly) take into account the (positive or negative) welfare 
effects for its own inhabitants. Welfare effects outside its own borders (also called 
interjurisdictional externalities) are neglected or heavily discounted, leading to suboptimal 
decision making that does not take into account the preferences of all people affected. 
Having larger jurisdictions leads to the inclusion of more affected citizens within the 
jurisdiction itself, which decreases the magnitude of the externalities, improving local 
government decision making and allocative efficiency (Oates 1972).  
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Hence, as for productive efficiency, counteracting effects of local government size on 
allocative efficiency are to be expected, and it is not feasible to deduce from theory which 
effects are stronger for which size ranges. 
Additional theoretical complications 
Since economies of size are especially relevant for smaller municipalities, while 
diseconomies of size are expected to be relevant mostly for larger municipalities, the 
efficiency curve for municipalities is generally believed to be shaped as a u-curve. This has 
empirical implications: even though the shape of this curve is unknown, amalgamation 
effects might differ depending on the size of the amalgamated municipalities, as well as the 
size of the newly formed municipality. A second consequence is that there should be an 
optimal size for municipalities that maximizes efficiency. However, the existence of such an 
optimal size is contested theoretically (Treisman 2007).  
First and foremost, a municipality does not have a single production process, but a multitude 
of processes. These processes have different characteristics that determine the extent to 
which economies of size are to be expected at all, as well as for which size ranges these 
economies of size can be attained (Hirsch 1959). This means that in order to find an optimal 
size for a municipality, one has to either split up a multipurpose unit into single-purpose 
units, or average an optimal size across several different public outputs (Ostrom 1972). Thus, 
even if it would be feasible to find an optimal size for single processes theoretically, finding 
an incontestable procedure to combine these findings into a general conclusion about an 
optimal size for jurisdictions is a whole different story.  
Supralocal public service production 
In the theoretical discussion on the effects of municipal size on productive and allocative 
efficiency so far, we have assumed that municipalities produce all public services at a local 
level. In practice, however, this is far from the truth. There are various ways in which local 
governments can choose to produce public services on a larger size than that of their own 
jurisdiction.  
Firstly, it is an option to engage in intermunicipal cooperation in order to join forces with 
(mostly) neighbouring municipalities. This can either be done by founding a new 
governmental body to which the production of one or more public services is delegated, or 
by one or more municipalities outsourcing that production to another municipality for an 
agreed upon fee. A second option is contracting out, where a municipality purchases the 
delivery of public services from a company that often services multiple municipalities or 
from another municipality. 
These alternatives for public service delivery create the possibility to set different scales for 
production of these services on the one hand, and administration on the other. 
Consequently, it is theoretically possible to have a variety of production scales for different 
public services, depending on which size is deemed optimal from an efficiency point of view. 
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This possibility in itself complicates the debate on the optimal size of local governments. But 
the option of supralocal production raises other questions as well. For instance, in what way 
is policy setting influenced by cooperation partners and to what extent is allocative 
efficiency affected by an increased distance between the producer and the administration? 
These questions make it even more difficult to find decisive answers to questions about the 
optimal size of local governments. 
Effects from administrative consequences of an amalgamation 
So far we have focussed on the question of how size affects efficiency of municipalities. 
Municipal amalgamations are of course highly relevant to this question because they are an 
instrument to increase the size of municipalities rigorously. However, apart from these size-
related effects, municipal amalgamations can also affect municipal efficiency by the 
administrative changes they imply, both temporarily and structurally.  
Already before the amalgamation itself, effects on public spending are to be expected 
because of the creation of a so-called common pool. This phenomenon originates from a 
setting formalized by Weingast et al. (1981), wherein multiple jurisdictions share a budget 
for public investments. They state that when (i) individual legislators care mainly (or 
exclusively) about the public projects that flow into their own jurisdictions (or benefit their 
inhabitants), (ii) the tax system that finances public projects is fixed and “decoupled” from 
the projects and (iii) the legislature is believed to adopt a norm of universalism, in which all 
projects proposed are passed, public spending will exceed efficient levels. This setting can be 
transformed into a two-period model that fits the situation that amalgamated municipalities 
are in (Tyrefors Hinnerich 2009). In this model, a credible announcement is being made that 
an amalgamation will take place. Now, all municipalities involved will know that any debts 
acquired for investments that are mainly beneficial to their own inhabitants, will be repaid 
from the newly formed common pool of taxes after amalgamation. Symmetrically, any 
reserves not depleted before amalgamation will end up in a common pool as well. This 
creates an incentive to increase public spending and raise debt levels before amalgamation 
above efficient levels. 
There are also several types of disruptive restructuring costs that can be expected around 
the time of amalgamation: both politicians and officials might get distracted from running 
the current municipality while focussing on the reorganization and their position thereafter, 
senior staff may opt for an early retirement or leave the organization due to uncertainty 
(leading to loss of expertise and organizational memory), staff morale might be damaged, 
and strategic decisions may be postponed in anticipation of the amalgamation (Andrews and 
Boyne 2012). These effects are expected to decrease efficiency temporarily.  
On the other hand, some structural benefits may arise as well. A restructuring operation 
resulting from an amalgamation may force the administrative organizations to evaluate their 
current procedures and operations. This provides them with an opportunity to adopt the 
most efficient practices from each other or introduce new practices altogether, probably 
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improving on well-established and possibly outdated ways of doing things (Hansen et al. 
2014).  
1.3 The need for empirical research and the position of this thesis therein 
So far, we have seen that the question of what size is optimal for local governments is 
answered with great ambiguity by governments internationally, even in relatively similar 
countries in Western Europe. At the same time, restructuring operations occur quite 
regularly and - in general - appear to aim for scaling up the size of local governments. Often, 
as is the case in the Netherlands, financial motivations and expectations of efficiency gains 
play a key role in the reasoning behind these operations.  
Yet the theory on efficiency effects of size presents us with two types of efficiency that are 
relevant in the discussion, a large variety of counteracting effects and number of additional 
complicating factors. Hence, since the question is highly topical and theory alone is unable to 
give conclusive answers, the need for empirical research is apparent.  
This thesis presents the results of empirical studies on two instruments used to increase size 
or scale, namely municipal amalgamation and intermunicipal cooperation, and their effects 
on efficiency. The third instrument available, scaling up through contracting out of public 
services is outside the scope of this thesis. 
The economic effects of municipal amalgamation 
The empirical research on effects of municipal amalgamations is quite extensive. Two meta-
analyses of literature on the topic have been published (Fox and Gurley 2006; Holzer 2009), 
and both conclude that the evidence of the existence of any effects is mixed. It should be 
noted that the studies covered by these authors consist mainly of case studies and studies 
using descriptive statistics.  
There do exist a number of studies that follow more econometrically complex approaches, 
but the overall picture remains ambiguous. Some studies find that amalgamations lead to 
higher spending (Lüchinger and Stutzer 2002, studying amalgamations in Switzerland; 
Hansen 2011 doing the same for Denmark, and Moisio and Uusitalo 2013 for Finland), 
whereas others have found that spending falls after amalgamations (Reingewertz 2012, 
Israel; Blesse and Baskaran 2013, Germany). 
Amalgamation effects are not expected to occur only after the amalgamation becomes a 
fact. Municipalities can also change spending behaviour in anticipation of the amalgamation 
itself, by creating debt or decreasing financial reserves (common pool effect). This effect has 
also been studied by a number of authors, and empirical evidence for its existence has 
indeed been reported for Sweden by Tyrefors Hinnerich (2009) and Jordahl and Liang (2009), 
for Denmark by Blom-Hansen (2010) and Hansen (2014) and for Finland by Saarimaa and 
Tukiainen (2013). 
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We add to the existing literature in several ways. With regard to econometrical issues, 
previous literature has used mainly cross-section data, or in one case static panel data. We 
are the first to use panel data in a dynamic setting, which seems to be the approach that 
best suits the extent to which municipal spending is determined by previous budgets and 
long term commitments.  
The choice to study Dutch municipalities allows us to make a second improvement on 
existing research. The referenced studies have focussed on restructuring operations that 
followed a so-called big bang approach: within a short period of time of at most a couple of 
years (one year in some cases) many municipalities have been amalgamated at once, 
allowing only for comparison of the period before and after this operation. In the 
Netherlands, amalgamations occur almost every year, enabling us to isolate the 
amalgamation effects from other temporal effects and also to compare amalgamated 
municipalities with other municipalities that have been amalgamated in a later year.  
In chapter 3 we present the results of our work. We find no evidence of any significant 
amalgamation effect on spending levels, be it positive or negative. These findings are 
consistent for other dependent variables that reflect municipal finances such as debt level, 
property tax revenues, employment and wages paid. These findings apply to both post-
amalgamation and pre-amalgamation (common pool) effects. 
One might argue that the fact that we found no significant amalgamation effects might be 
the result of counteracting effects for small and large municipalities that are averaged out by 
taking the joint effect on all municipalities simultaneously. To investigate this, we interact 
the amalgamation effect with population size. Chapter 4 presents the results of our 
extended analysis, indicating that our initial findings hold for all size ranges. We use the 
same method of interacting to see whether large differences in political preferences of 
amalgamating municipalities shortly before the amalgamation lead to an increase in 
spending, but find no evidence of that effect either.  
Although changes in municipal spending levels are an indicator of local government 
efficiency, focussing on spending alone constitutes an approach that is too narrow. It is 
imperative that the analysis should not only focus on the input side of the municipal 
organization, its expenditures, but also look at the output side: the public services provided 
by making those expenditures. Only two studies are known to have done such a thing in the 
past (Reingewertz 2012; Blesse and Baskaran 2013). However, the output indicators used in 
these studies seem to have been rather arbitrary; selected because of availability of data, 
not out of conviction that they cover the full range of the multi-service jurisdictions that 
municipalities are. Alternatively, Rouse and Putterill (2005) focused on a specific area of 
public services (highway maintenance) and used data envelopment analysis (DEA) to test 
whether amalgamation in New Zealand increased efficiency there (it didn’t). Bikker and Van 
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der Linde (2015) took a similar approach, using a stochastic cost frontier estimation on 
spending on local public administration6 between 2005 and 2014 in the Netherlands. They 
find that for this function there are substantial unused economies of scale of around 20% for 
the average municipality. In chapter 4 we present our approach which is twofold and 
different from previous studies. We first examine whether the composition of expenditures 
is changed after amalgamation. If service levels would be affected, this would probably be 
visible in a shift from spending on activities that are less observable to inhabitants to 
activities that are more observable. Spending on administration does not benefit public 
service levels directly, but economies of size are highly likely to be found here, because the 
number of administrators and council members does not grow in proportion to population 
size. Several studies looked into these expenditures. Blom-Hansen et al. (2012) and Moisio 
and Uusitalo (2013) found evidence of lower expenditures on administration in 
amalgamated municipalities in Denmark and Finland, respectively. Our own study shows 
results in line with these findings, as we also see a decrease of spending on administration 
after amalgamation. However, this does not imply that there is a shift to spending on highly 
observable public services. When studying spending on culture and recreation, the budget 
category that mainly covers this type of spending, we observe no significant effects 
whatsoever. 
As a second approach to including service levels in the analysis, we study amalgamation 
effects on house prices. Previous studies have shown that through capitalization a more 
efficient local government should increase the value of houses within the municipal border 
(Allers and Vermeulen 2016). However, we find no evidence of any effect on house prices. 
All in all, the study on the effects of municipal amalgamation introduces several new 
approaches and uses a data set uniquely suitable for isolating these effects, but we find no 
robust evidence of the existence of any such effects on local government efficiency, either 
temporal or permanent. 
The effects of intermunicipal cooperation on efficiency 
The topicality of intermunicipal cooperation in the field of public administration is 
underlined by the existence of quite a few recent studies on the topic. A significant portion 
of those studies do not share our focus on the effects on spending and efficiency, but focus 
on what drives municipalities to engage in intergovernmental cooperation instead (e.g., in 
the German state Hesse (Blaeschke 2014), municipalities in France in the period 1995-2003 
(Di Porto et al. 2013); cities in the United States in 2004 (Feiock et al. 2009) and 2007 (Hefetz 
and Warner 2011; LeRoux et al. 2010)).  
Studies on the effects of intermunicipal cooperation are limited in their econometrical 
approach. Dollery et al. (2009) have drawn up a list of international studies on these effects, 
                                                        
6 This local public administration is a broader spending category than the administration expenditures we use. 
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but find only survey studies or descriptive case studies . Bel and Warner (2015) survey the 
literature, and find just eight econometric studies on the effect of cooperation on public 
service costs or spending. All of these study solid waste services, one of them in combination 
with water, electricity and gas (Garrone et al. 2013). Most use spending on solid waste 
collection or waste disposal fees as dependent variable; some but not all control for 
differences in output and quality. Five conclude that cooperation reduces costs, where it is 
worth mentioning that four studies focus on waste collection and management in Spain (Bel 
and Costas 2006; Bel and Mur 2009; Zafra-Gómez et al. 2013; Bel et al. 2014) and one the 
same function in the Netherlands (Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2013). Two find rising costs 
(Sørensen (2007) in Norway and Garrone et al. (2013) in Italy) and one has insignificant 
results (Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2014) in the Netherlands). Not included in that survey but 
relevant in the context of our research are a Dutch study that finds no differences in 
efficiency between municipalities providing household solid waste services alone or in 
cooperation with other municipalities (Felsö et al. 2011) and an article by Frère et al. (2014) 
who find no effect of cooperation on total spending (not efficiency) of French municipalities. 
Academics engaged in empirical studies on efficiency in this field have important issues to 
tackle (Geys and Moesen 2009). Firstly, to study efficiency it does not suffice to measure 
spending. To control for changes in public service levels, a measure of output has to be 
controlled for. However, variables measuring this output are hard to define, compare and 
quantify. Indicators that are available are usually at best crude proxies for the true level of 
public good provision. This is an explanation for the fact that a large portion of the literature 
focuses on waste disposal services, since for those services, data issues for output are less 
relevant. A second problem for empirical studies on local government efficiency is that often 
strong assumptions have to be made (e.g., regarding the cost function), or that they are 
prone to data errors (if data envelopment analysis is used). 
For our study on the effects of intermunicipal cooperation, we take an entirely different 
approach. Instead of focussing on the full costs of providing a certain public service, we focus 
on the efficiency of an organizational activity that is relevant in a broad range of public 
services: the procurement of credit. With access to a unique dataset that holds information 
on a micro-level on the interest rates that Dutch intermunicipal organizations and 
municipalities paid for loans, we are able to determine to which extent differences are 
explained by characteristics of the loan in question. The credit risk for loans to these entities 
is in all cases zero, and since this dataset allows us to control for all relevant characteristics 
that could theoretically affect the interest rates, any significant difference in interest rates is 
bound to be the result of inefficiency. 
Different theories predict different outcomes with regard to intermunicipal cooperation and 
(in)efficiency. Based on agency theory it can be argued that services delivered through 
intermunicipal cooperation are less closely monitored than those delivered by the 
municipality itself. This undermonitoring would lead to inefficiency. On the other hand, 
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public choice theory predicts that since the decision making process under intermunicipal 
cooperation is distanced from local politicians, this reduces their ability to let personal goals 
affect this process. Hence, intermunicipal cooperation leads to less political meddling and 
higher efficiency. 
Our outcomes show that intermunicipal organizations do pay significantly higher interest 
rates than municipalities. This result is robust for all types of loans. The average effect of 
intermunicipal cooperation is a difference in paid interest rates of 4% (not percent point). 
Through some basic calculations, it can be shown that this amounts to extra interest of 
around € 10.000 - 15.000 euro per loan, which leads us to the conclusion that the effort put 
into negotiating for better rates is below efficient levels. This inefficiency can not be found 
for amalgamated municipalities. There are no significant differences between interest rates 
for municipalities that have amalgamated in the last 8 years and those that have not.  
Further analysis of the inefficiency effect leads us to observe that it is not affected by the 
legal form of the intermunicipal cooperation, by the kind of public service that is delivered 
through cooperation, or by the number of municipalities that is involved in the cooperation. 
Hence, we can conclude that intermunicipal cooperation leads to inefficiency, regardless of 
any observable characteristics of this cooperation.  
1.4 Reading guide 
 
In this thesis, economical effects of both municipal amalgamations and intermunicipal 
cooperation will be discussed. In chapter 2 we will present the setup and the initial empirical 
study on the effects of municipal amalgamations. This chapter focusses on the effects both 
before and after amalgamation on a number of financial dependent variables. Chapter 3 is 
an extension to this initial study, and presents the results of various additional tests we have 
run to find out whether our initial findings on municipal expenditures are somehow the 
result of counteracting amalgamation effects that were averaged out. In this chapter, we 
also study whether there are effects on spending on certain public services or on the overall 
level of public services. Chapter 4 presents the outcomes of a study regarding inefficiency as 
a result of intermunicipal cooperation. Chapter 5 summarizes our findings and presents 
suggestions for future research on these topics. 
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Chapter 2 - The effects of amalgamation on local finances 
This chapter is based on Allers and Geertsema (2016). 
Policiymakers have several ways of changing the scale on which local public services are 
produced. They can contract out certain public services to private companies or engage in 
intermunicipal cooperation to produce public services at a supralocal level. Most rigorously, 
they can choose to amalgamate with one or more other municipalities, leading to a scaling 
up of production for all public services that were previously produced on a local level. As 
described in our introduction, there is an ongoing debate on the question whether this 
would reduce municipal spending and/or diminish efficiency, with theories predicting 
counteracting effects of scaling up and empirical research showing mixed results. 
Our initial empirical analysis focuses on these amalgamations, and their effects on various 
aspects of local finances, such as levels of spending, debt and tax revenues. We start off with 
an exploration of local government in the Netherlands in general and an overview of the 
Dutch situation with regard to municipal amalgamations. Next, we present our basic 
analysis, which is set up to answer the question whether amalgamations have any effect on 
local finances, before or after amalgamations. We describe our econometric model and the 
variables used to measure the amalgamation effects. Next, we describe our identification 
strategy, followed by a detailed description of the data used. The first results are retrieved 
for our main dependent variable, which is total per capita expenditures. The chapter 
concludes with the results of regressions on alternative dependent variables, describing 
amalgamation effects on various aspects of local finances (spending on wages, debt levels 
and property tax revenues). 
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2.1 Institutional background 
Municipalities in the Netherlands 
In the Netherlands, there are three territorial layers of government: in addition to the 
national government, the country is divided into 12 provinces and into 418 municipalities (in 
2011)7. All three layers cover the entire country. All provinces have more or less the same 
set of tasks and responsibilities and taxation options, as do all municipalities.  
Municipalities provide a broad array of public services. Some of these are mandated by the 
central government, but municipalities are free to take up new tasks. There is no legal 
restriction on borrowing (Allers, forthcoming). About two thirds of Dutch municipalities’ 
revenues consists of grants from the central government (Allers and Elhorst, 2005). Roughly 
one third of revenues consists of municipal levies and income from property and market 
activities. It must be noted that income from property is largely market driven and income 
from market activities cannot be spent freely because it is largely offset by the costs of these 
activities. Taxes and user fees account for approximately 15 percent of municipal revenues. 
Municipalities are allowed to impose a limited number of taxes only, but they can decide on 
tax rates freely.8 The property tax is by far the most important local tax. Other local taxes are 
insubstantial or only raise significant revenues in a limited number of municipalities. 
Although matching grants exist, much of grant revenue is independent of local spending. 
Therefore, spending reductions may be used to cut taxes, which may be politically attractive: 
Allers and Elhorst (2005) show that Dutch municipal tax rates are influenced by political 
yardstick competition. Municipalities use accrual accounting, and local budgets must be 
balanced. 
Municipal amalgamations in the Netherlands 
The number of municipalities has been steadily declining for a long time. Figure 2.1 clearly 
illustrates this. We see that in the period 1997-2011, 2008 was the only year in which there 
was not a single amalgamation. As a result, Dutch municipalities had around 40,000 
inhabitants on average in 2011, which makes them relatively large compared to those in 
other countries.  
 
  
                                                        
7 For this thesis, I do not consider the Caribbean part of the Netherlands, where special municipalities were 
established as per 10th October 2010. 
8 In 2006 and 2007, property tax rates were capped at the municipality level. 
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Figure 2.1: Number of amalgamations and average municipal population size 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Number of municipalities per amalgamation, 1997-2011 
 
In 1997-2011, the number of municipalities was reduced by 154 (figure 2.1). Often, two or 
three municipalities were merged, but the number of municipalities involved in an 
amalgamation ranges from two to six (figure 2.2). Most municipalities selected for 
amalgamation (234 out of 329) had between 5,000 and 20,000 inhabitants (figure 2.3). After 
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Figure 2.3: Number of amalgamated municipalities by population size 
 
Figure 2.4: Number of newly formed municipalities by population size 
 
Roughly speaking, amalgamations come in two types. The first type involves municipalities 
which do not differ too much in size (a “merger of equals”). The second type of 
amalgamation is characterized by the absorption of a small municipality into a big 
neighbour. In the Netherlands, the first type, which we will denote simply by 
“amalgamations”, occurs far more often than the second, denoted as “annexations” (figure 
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thing, amalgamations require setting up new organizational structures, whereas annexations 
do not. Empirical studies should take this into account. 
In policy debates in the Netherlands, the most important reason for amalgamation is that 
the scale of many municipalities is deemed too small for effective administration. The 
central government has decentralized many public tasks to local governments, a process of 
which the end is not yet in sight. Increasingly, small municipalities find it difficult to cope 
with this stream of new tasks. They lack the necessary manpower, or they become 
vulnerable because certain tasks can only be performed by one or two specialized officers. 
Amalgamations may ease such problems. Often, it is also assumed that scaling up local 
government will increase efficiency, because economies of scale can be exploited.  
Figure 2.5: Population share of largest amalgamation partner, 1997-2011 
 
The final decision to amalgamate municipalities is made by the national parliament, usually 
in the year preceding the amalgamation, which normally is effected on the first day of a 
calendar year. Of course, several years of debate and preparations precede any 
amalgamation. Amalgamations may happen at the request of the municipalities concerned, 
but they can also forced upon those municipalities. In many cases, it is hard to say to what 
extent an amalgamation is voluntary or mandatory. Provinces play an important role here, 
initializing and coordinating amalgamations. Some provinces are more active in this respect 
than others. This is one of the reasons why amalgamated municipalities are not spread out 
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2.2 Basic analysis 
Since we have budgetary data on 418 municipalities for a period up to 12 years, we have an 
opportunity to study amalgamation effects using a panel data model into which we can 
introduce a number of amalgamation dummies. We first explain our choice of the type of 
panel data model. 
We start our analysis with a fixed effects model: 
ݕ௜௧ = ௜ܺ௧ߚ + ߙ௧ܫ௡ + ߟ௜ + ߛ௜ݐ + ߳௜௧ (1) 
where ݕ௜௧  is the dependent variable, ௜ܺ௧ is the vector of (strictly exogenous) explanatory 
variables, ߙ௧ is a time scalar and ܫ௡ is a Column vector of ones, ߟ௜  is an unobserved individual 
effect, t is a linear time trend that is allowed a municipality-specific effect and ߳௜௧ is an 
unobserved white noise disturbance. The subscript i denotes municipalities (i = 1…n), the 
subscript t denotes years.  
 
Previous econometric studies of amalgamations rely on static models. In the related 
literature on political business cycles, however, dynamic models are common (e.g. Brender 
and Drazen, 2005; Alt and Lassen, 2006). This is motivated by the nature of the dependent 
variable, being local expenditures. While these are partly discretionary and as such can be 
changed from year to year, spending in many categories changes only gradually. First, 
because national regulations and popular expectations often oblige municipalities to deliver 
certain services, as a result of which part of total spending is pre-committed (Allers and 
Elhorst, 2011). Secondly, spending decisions involve rather complex trade-offs between 
political priorities. The previous year’s budget often serves as a point of reference, and only 
limited changes are made every year (Bennett, 1984). Moreover, the apparatus of 
government is largely fixed in the short term. Hence, budgetary decision-making is likely to 
be incremental (Wildavsky, 1964). Therefore, we do not limit our analysis to static models 
but use dynamic models as well, including a one year lag of the dependent variable.  
In our dataset, the time dimension (T=11)9 is rather limited. Using dummy variables (LSDV) 
to estimate individual effects in a dynamic model then results in biased estimates. Various 
estimation methods have been proposed to cope with this problem, either using 
instrumental estimators (e.g., Generalize Method of Moments, GMM) or using a direct bias 
correction. The most commonly used estimator in situations like these has become system 
GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998), which relies heavily on a large N in the data panels 
(preferably approaching infinity). However, Judson and Owen (1999) and Behr (2003) run 
Monte Carlo simulations to compare estimation methods that have been developed for 
cases with limited T and small or moderate N, and both conclude that the estimators using 
                                                        
9 We have expenditure data for 2002-2013. Because we include a lagged dependent variable, we lose one year 
in our regressions. 
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direct bias correction are superior even for panels with N = 100. The latter does find that 
GMM and especially system GMM is a better alternative for panels with N = 1,000.  
Bias corrected LSDV estimators have since been used as a robustness check by several 
authors (e.g., Eicher and Schreiber, 2010; Brick et al., 2012) and as the estimator of choice by 
others who have data panels with small N (e.g., Potrafke, 2012; Aidt and Mooney, 2014). 
Since the number of municipalities in our preferred data panel (N = 135) is close to 100, we 
also use the corrected LSDV method (Kiviet, 1995; 1999), in Bruno’s (2005) implementation 
to deal with the fact that our panel is unbalanced.10 The method is based on a standard 
dynamic panel data model: 
ݕ௜௧ = ߛݕ௜,௧ିଵ + ௜ܺ௧ߚ + ߙ௧ܫ௡ + ߟ௜ + ߳௜௧ (2) 
The dependent variables and the control variables are expressed in logs.11 That is because 
we expect amalgamation to have a proportional effect on spending, if at all, and not a 
constant effect. 
In order to study the effects of amalgamations, we first extend models (1) and (2) to include 
a number of amalgamation dummies. This is the standard approach in the literature. 
Because we expect short term effects to differ from long term effects, and pre-
amalgamation effects from post-amalgamation effects, we use four different amalgamation 
dummies: 
Apre for the period of three years to one year before amalgamation. Although the 
definitive decision to amalgamate is typically made in the year before amalgamation, 
plans and preparations are being made in earlier years, quite possibly incurring some 
reorganization costs. If any common pool effects were to exist, these would be 
observable in the coefficient for this dummy. 
A0-3 for the period of the amalgamation year itself to three years after amalgamation. In 
this four year period the lion’s share of transition costs is expected to be made. To 
help municipalities finance these costs, the allocation formula of the general grant12 
awards a temporarily higher grant for amalgamated municipalities (in the first four 
years only).  
                                                        
10 The system GMM estimator of Blundell and Bond (1998) is used as the initial estimator. Using the Arellano-
Bond (1991) instead yields nearly identical results. Standard errors are approximated by a bootstrap algorithm 
with fifty repetitions. Since no information on the goodness of fit of the CLSDV model is available, we have 
rerun all regressions as a regular LSDV test with fixed effects (including a lagged dependent variable), and 
provide the R² of these estimations. Although these values give no accurate measure of the goodness of fit of 
the CLSDV model, they do give a good indication of the relative goodness of fit of the various CLSDV 
regressions. However, they are not comparable with the R² values given for the static regressions. 
11 One exception is made for ideology of the coalition, since this variable can take a value of zero. 
12 The general grant is the main component of the municipality fund, which is used for transferring funds from 
the central government to municipalities. 
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A4-10 for the long term period of four to ten years after amalgamation. Although no 
siginificant transaction costs are expected in this period, some temporal 
amalgamation effects might still work through in this period (due to e.g., 
employment contracts being served out to avoid lay-off costs). The long term 
economies of scale-effects are expected to become prevalent in this period. 
A11+  for the period of eleven or more years after amalgamation. Temporal amalgamation 
effects are expected to be negligible. Note that this dummy will only be take a value 
of one for municipalities that have amalgamated before 2003. 
Amalgamations normally take effect on the 1st of January of a certain year and that year is 
marked as the amalgamation year where the dummy A0-3 takes the value of 1 for the first 
time.  
2.3 Identification strategy 
We use difference-in-difference estimation, comparing changes in spending of amalgamated 
municipalities (the treatment group) with those of a control group of municipalities that 
were not amalgamated. Difference-in-difference estimation has been applied to study the 
effects of amalgamations before by Lüchinger and Stutzer (2002), Tyrefors Hinnerich (2009), 
Jordahl and Liang (2010), Reingewertz (2012) and Blesse and Baskaran (2013). Like these 
authors, we exploit the fact that some municipalities were amalgamated and others were 
not. Moreover, the staggered nature of the Dutch amalgamations allows us to also utilize 
the fact that amalgamations took place in different years, as opposed to the big bang 
approach (with a large number of amalgamations at the same time) mostly used in other 
countries. 
An important assumption in difference-in-difference estimation is that the error term is 
uncorrelated with the treatment status. Obviously, selection for amalgamation is not 
random. To control for the forces that drive selection, an instrumental variables approach 
may sometimes be used. This would require an instrument that influences selection for 
amalgamation, but not budgetary outcomes. It is unlikely that such an instrument exists. We 
take an alternative approach: including all relevant variables affecting selection in the 
budgetary regressions as controls. Although one can never be sure that all relevant variables 
have been included, many of these are likely to be relatively time-invariant, like, e.g., 
location within a certain province. Including municipal and year fixed effects takes care of 
these. We control for time-variant variables affecting selection by including municipality-
specific time trends and a number of control variables. 
Despite these measures, selection bias might still be present. If some municipalities are 
badly managed, with deteriorating public services or rising tax rates, citizens might revolt 
and press for amalgamation. If, after amalgamation, such municipalities perform as well as 
not-amalgamated municipalities (which were performing satisfactorily), this improvement 
might not be found in our results. A second important assumption is therefore that the 
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treatment group and the control group consist of municipalities with similar budgetary 
trends. Both groups should consist of comparable municipalities. We have three different 
control groups at our disposal. We can take all municipalities that were not amalgamated, or 
that were amalgamated but in a different year. This control group is not entirely satisfactory, 
as amalgamated municipalities have different characteristics from non-amalgamated 
municipalities. A second option is to use municipalities that were amalgamated, but in a 
different year. This control group resembles the treatment group well. Our preferred control 
group, following Reingewertz (2012), is created by adding to the second control group 34 
municipalities that were set to amalgamate, but have, for political reasons, been left intact. 
This control group is denoted as “amalgamated or almost amalgamated” and used in our 
basic setup throughout this and the next chapter. 
2.4 Data 
We have spending data for 2002-2013. We rebuilt the dataset in such a way that all 
amalgamations are retroactively applied to the data. Thus, we organize our data as if all 
amalgamations had been implemented by 2002. We have information on amalgamations in 
1997-2013. We drop five municipalities that were amalgamated twice in this period from our 
dataset, along with the fourteen that amalgamated in 2012 and 2013. Amalgamated 
municipalities that had a dominant partner (a municipality more than 85% of the post-
amalgamation population size), are marked as annexations and excluded as well. This results 
in spending data for 388 municipalities, of which 101 were created through amalgamation, 
34 were selected for amalgamation but left intact (“almost amalgamated”) and 252 were not 
amalgamated. Figure 2.7 shows the geographical distribution of these groups. 
The main dependent budgetary variable is total per capita expenditures. We exclude 
expenditures on land purchases and land development from total expenditures. In some 
cases, these form a considerable part of total expenditures (on average 9 percent, with 
extremes up to 75 percent), but they are highly volatile due to their incidental nature, and 
they are not relevant for our study. Spending data is provided by Statistics Netherlands. 
Unfortunately, data is missing for some municipalities in some years. As a result, we have an 
unbalanced panel. Amounts are expressed in euros of 2013 using the consumer price index. 
The matrix Xit consists of several control variables. As described above, central government 
grants constitute a large part of total municipal income. We include per capita amounts of 
the general, non-earmarked equalization grant. Data on earmarked intergovernmental 
grants are only available from 2010 onward. However, the correlation between the general 
grant and the total of other intergovernmental grants is very high (Allers and Van Gelder, 
2013). Thus, the general grant seems to be an adequate proxy for the total size of central 
government grants.13 As this is an equalization grant, allocated through a formula containing 
                                                        
13 The allocation formula of the general grant awards a temporarily higher grant for amalgamated 
municipalities (in the first four years only). This is meant to help them finance the transition costs which follow 
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more than 50 demographic, physical and other local characteristics outside the control of 
the local government, this variable indirectly controls for a great number of variables that 
might influence both spending and selection for amalgamation. 
Figure 2.7 Geographical distribution of the different control groups 
 
 
To discover what variables determine the probability that municipalities were amalgamated 
in the period studied, we ran a logistic regression on data for 2000. The dependent variable 
was a dummy that took the value one if the municipality was to be amalgamated in 2001-
2011. Not surprisingly, smaller municipalities turn out to be more likely to amalgamate. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
amalgamation. Inclusion of control variables that are affected by the treatment should normally be avoided. 
That is because indirect effects of the treatment working through such controls may load on these controls, 
downwardly biasing the estimates of the treatment effect. In this case, amalgamation temporarily raises the 
grant, as a result of which spending is likely to go up. By including the general grant we control for this indirect 
effect. We chose to include the grant variable because our analysis extends well beyond the four-year period 
for which this might be problematic. Grants are the most important source of municipal revenue. Changes in 
grants not due to amalgamations should therefore be controlled for. As a robustness test, we will check 





Dropped from analysis (31)
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Table 2.1: Determinants of amalgamation 
Population in 2000 -9.57e-
05*** 
 (-5.469) 
General grant per capita in 2000 -0.000659 
 (-0.419) 
Houses per capita in 2000 -0.683 
 (-0.269) 
Density in 2000 0.974** 
 (2.489) 
Observations 473 
Dependent variable: probability that municipality is amalgamated in 2001-2011. 
z-statistics in parentheses. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Province dummies and constant included but not reported. 
 
Density, measured as the average number of addresses per square kilometer, also affects 
the likelihood of amalgamation. Table 2.1 presents the results of this regression. In order to 
avoid selection bias, both population size and density are included as control variables. 
Population was included for a different reason as well: spending may not grow 
proportionately to population size. Just like amalgamation, autonomous population growth 
results in larger municipalities which may lead to economies of scale. Although not included 
in table 2.1, province dummies also have significant effects on the probability of being 
selected for amalgamation, but these are superfluous as we include municipal fixed effects.14 
A fourth control variable is the political ideology of the municipal government. For each 
municipality, we divide the council seats held by the coalition parties into left-wing, right-
wing and other parties. We have chosen this as our main indicator instead of the ideology of 
the entire council (including opposition parties), since local policy will mainly be determined 
by the coalition parties. Even though opposition parties might have some influence, 
important issues that significantly impact  
  
                                                        
14 In the period under study, provincial boundaries have not changed.  
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Table 2.2: Mean values of control variables and dependent variables for different groups 







Amalgamated or almost 
amalgamated 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean Min Max 
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Number of municipalities 387 286 101 135   
Standard errors within parentheses. Amounts are expressed in euros of 2013. 
a Source: Statistics Netherlands (CBS) 
b Source: Estimated (hedonic regression) using data from Dutch Association of Realtors (NVM) 
c Source: Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations 
d Source: Statistics Netherlands (CBS) and Associations of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG) 
e Some variables are not available for the entire period 
 
local government budgets will be discussed during coalition negotiations. Hence, opposition 
influence on local spending is negligible. We measure ideology as the share of left-wing 
parties on a scale from 0 to 1.15 In accordance with partisan theory (for Dutch evidence, see 
Allers et al. 2001), we expect government expenditures to increase when left wing parties 
are in charge and vice versa.  
                                                        
15 This is done by counting the number of seats for left wing parties, adding one half of the seats of parties of 
“neutral” ideology (e.g. local parties without a clear ideological disposition) and dividing the sum by the total 
number of coalition seats. The national parties PvdA (social democrats), Groen Links (the green left), SP 
(socialist party), D66 (left wing liberals) and CU (social christians) are counted as left wing parties, whereas VVD 
(conservative liberals), CDA (christian democrats) and SGP (orthodox christians) are counted as right wing 
parties. Local parties that have a clear right or left wing signature are treated accordingly. 
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Two more political variables are included to control for differences in the political power to 
influence spending: the political concentration of the municipal council (Herfindahl index) 
and the share of council seats taken by the parties that form the ruling coalition. 
Amalgamations are sometimes accompanied by local elections, depending on whether they 
take place in or near national election years.16 In order to control for possible political 
budget cycle effects we include three election dummies: for the election year itself as well as 
for the year before elections and the year thereafter. Table 2.2 compares dependent 
variables and control variables for different control groups.  
2.5 Results 
Graphical analysis 
Figure 2.8 presents the course of total per capita expenditures for three control groups. 
Differences between amalgamated municipalities on the one hand and amalgamated or 
almost amalgamated municipalities on the other hand are so small they are hardly visible. 
Non-amalgamated municipalities show the same pattern, but at a higher level.  
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Table 2.3: Regressions of total per capita spending, static and dynamic panel models 
Control group Amalgamated or almost amalgamated 
Model Static Static Static Dynamic Dynamic 
Regression number 1 2 3 4 5 
Apre -0.01 -0.03 -0.04* -0.03* -0.03* 
 (-0.25) (-1.65) (-1.86) (-1.85) (-1.84) 
A0-3 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 
 (0.30) (0.27) (-0.99) (-0.45) (0.11) 
A4-10 0.08*** 0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.00 
 (2.92) (1.16) (-0.58) (0.24) (0.12) 
A11+ 0.11*** 0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
 (3.40) (1.10) (-0.29) (0.09) (0.03) 
Lagged dependent    0.45*** 0.47*** 
    (13.41) (12.72) 
General grant 0.46*** 0.19 -0.09 0.29*** 0.03 
 (10.07) (1.53) (-1.04) (11.08) (0.28) 
Population -1.07*** -1.11*** -1.25*** -0.30* -0.42*** 
 (-4.84) (-4.76) (-4.00) (-1.93) (-2.73) 
Density 1.01*** 0.74*** 0.30 0.18 0.36** 
 (6.94) (3.31) (1.28) (1.50) (2.46) 
Ideology (left) 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.05*** 0.01 
 (1.43) (0.40) (0.86) (3.06) (0.52) 
Concentration  0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.00 
in council (1.13) (1.06) (-1.00) (0.98) (0.14) 
Coalition power -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.00 
in council (-0.69) (-0.66) (0.52) (0.31) (-0.27) 
Pre-election year 0.03*** 0.01 0.02 0.03*** -0.00 
 (4.87) (0.81) (1.24) (3.85) (-0.06) 
Election year -0.03*** 0.06** 0.06** -0.02** 0.03 
 (-3.48) (2.59) (2.61) (-2.18) (0.90) 
Post-election year -0.03*** 0.02 0.02* -0.02*** 0.01 
 (-4.16) (1.64) (1.96) (-2.93) (0.31) 
Year effects No Yes Yes No Yes 
Municipal fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal time trends No No Yes No No 
Observations 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,339 1,339 
Municipalities 135 135 135 135 135 
R2 (within) 0.45 0.52 0.74   
Pseudo-R2    0.62 0.67 
T-values between parentheses, based on robust standard errors clustered by municipality. Variables are 
expressed in logs. * denotes significance at the 10% confidence level, ** significance at the 5% confidence 
level, and *** significance at the 1% confidence level. 
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Econometric analysis 
Table 2.3 reports regression results of total expenditures, using as a control group 
municipalities that were amalgamated in a different year, or that had been selected for 
amalgamation but were left intact.17 Different control groups will be introduced in table 2.5.  
All regressions include fixed effects at the municipal level, to control for unobserved time-
invariant local characteristics. The first three columns in table 2.3 present regressions of the 
basic static panel model of total spending. In the first regression we include only 
amalgamation dummies, a constant, and control variables. This renders insignificant 
amalgamation effects before and shortly after amalgamation, but the medium and long term 
effects are highly significant. This significance disappears after adding year dummies (column 
2) that control for nationwide temporal effects, like law changes or national budget cuts that 
affect the local playing field. Adding municipality-specific linear time trends (column 3) does 
not have much impact, although one (negative) pre-amalgamation effect now borders on 
significance. Theoretically, we would expect a pre-amalgamation effect to be positive. For 
the periods after amalgamation, amalgamation effects are insignificant. Earlier studies using 
static models found lower spending (Reingewertz, 2012; Blesse and Baskaran, 2013) or 
higher spending (Lüchinger and Stutzer 2002; Hansen, 2011; Moisio and Uusitalo, 2013) after 
amalgamation. 
Columns (4) and (5) in table 2.3 present the results of the dynamic regression model. Per 
capita municipal spending is positively affected by density and negatively by population size, 
as expected, and the lagged dependent is highly significant. However, whether year 
dummies are included or not, all post-amalgamation coefficients are close to zero and far 
from significant. We do see that the pre-amalgamation effect still borders on significance, 
but it does not have the expected sign. 
Tests 
Table 2.3 suggests that amalgamation does not affect total local government spending. We 
now put this result to a number of tests.  
First, we test for differences in spending between municipalities that are later amalgamated 
and other municipalities. As explained, such differences might point to selection bias as 
amalgamation might be more likely in badly-run municipalities. We have run regressions 
with dummies measuring the amalgamation effect 4 to 10 years before, 1 to 3 years before 
and 0 to 3 after amalgamation. The results are presented in table 2.4. Control variables are 
included in the regressions but coefficients are no longer reported. We see that there is no 
significant effect on total per capita spending.  
                                                        
17 The dependent variables and the control variables are expressed in logs. As a result, the coefficients of 
continuous variables can be interpreted as elasticities. Before interpreting the coefficient of a dummy variable, 
one must take the exponent. For example, if the coefficient of a dummy is 0.20, then, when the dummy takes 
the value 1, the dependent variable is 22 percent larger than otherwise (e^0.2=1.22). 
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Table 2.4: Regression for long term pre-amalgamation effects  
Control group Amalgamated or almost amalgamated 





Apre (4-10) -0.00 
 (-0.15) 




Lagged dependent 0.70*** 
 (16.90) 
Control variables Yes 
Year effects Yes 
Municipality fixed effects Yes 




T-values between parentheses, based on robust standard errors clustered by municipality. Variables are 
expressed in logs. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Next, we repeat the analyses in table 2.3 in three different ways: including annexations 
(amalgamations with a dominant partner, chapter 1); using dummies A4-8 and A9+ instead of 
A4-10 and A11+, respectively; using the ideology of the entire local council, instead of only 
those parties that form the ruling coalition, and excluding the general grant as a control 
variable (since this grant is higher during the four-year period following amalgamation). In 
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Table 2.5: Various robustness tests  
 
 Annexations included A4-8 and A9+ instead of 
A4-10 and A11+. 
Without general grant as 
a control variable 
Model Static Dynamic  Static Dynamic  Static Dynamic 
 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Apre -0.04** -0.03* -0.04* -0.03* -0.04** -0.03* 
 (-2.09) (-1.93) (-1.80) (-1.86) (-2.00) (-1.82) 
A0-3 -0.02 -0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.04 0.01 
 (-0.82) (-0.08) (-0.89) (0.08) (-1.17) (0.24) 
A4-10 -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.00 
 (-0.43) (-0.05) (-0.43) (0.10) (-0.59) (0.16) 
A11+ -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 
 (-0.12) (-0.10) (-0.17) (-0.03) (-0.33) (-0.02) 
Lagged dependent  0.70***  0.70***  0.71*** 
  (20.37)  (17.25)  (17.06) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality time trends Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Observations 1,681 1,463 1,541 1,339 1,541 1,339 
Municipalities 147 147 135 135 135 135 
R2 (within) 0.73  0.74  0.73  
Pseudo-R2  0.66  0.67  0.67 
T-values between parentheses, based on robust standard errors clustered by municipality. Variables are expressed in logs. 
Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
In table 2.6, we present regression results for different control groups. Columns (13) and 
(16) in table 2.6 match columns (3) and (5) in table 2.3. In columns (14) and (17) we remove 
the almost amalgamated municipalities from the control group, leaving only the 
municipalities that have indeed been amalgamated. In columns (15) and (18) we include all 
municipalities, except for those municipalities that have been dropped from the dataset 
altogether (see above). We see here that the pre-amalgamation effect is insignificant for the 
other control groups, implying that it is not robust. 
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Table 2.6: Regressions of total per capita spending: alternative control groups  
Model Static Static Static Dynamic Dynamic Dynamic 
Control group Amalgamated 
or almost 
amalgamated 




Regression number 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Apre -0.04* -0.05** -0.03 -0.03* -0.02 -0.02 
 (-1.86) (-2.19) (-1.54) (-1.84) (-1.43) (-1.33) 
A0-3 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 
 (-0.99) (-1.36) (-0.80) (0.11) (0.62) (0.26) 
A4-10 -0.02 -0.03 -0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 
 (-0.58) (-0.82) (-0.09) (0.12) (0.77) (0.43) 
A11+ -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 
 (-0.29) (-0.40) (0.28) (0.03) (0.91) (0.43) 
Lagged dependent    0.70*** 0.69*** 0.75*** 
    (17.19) (12.40) (44.50) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal fixed eff.  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal time trends Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Observations 1,541 1,144 4,492 1,339 985 3,983 
Municipalities 135 101 387 135 101 387 
R2 0.74 0.73 0.70    
Pseudo-R2 (within)    0.67 0.68 0.63 
T-values between parentheses, based on robust standard errors clustered by municipality. Variables are expressed in logs. * 
denotes significance at the 10% confidence level, ** significance at the 5% confidence level, and *** significance at the 1% 
confidence level. 
 
Robustness tests: alternative econometric models 
As a further robustness test, we use two alternative models. The first embodies an 
instrumental variable approach. Here, instead of Apre, A0-3, A4-10, and A11+, we use average 
population per jurisdiction as dependent variable of interest. Before amalgamation this 
variable is calculated as the population of the amalgamated municipality divided by the 
number of amalgamating jurisdictions. After amalgamation, it is equal to the population. We 
instrument this variable on a simple dummy (Amalgamated), which takes the value of one in 
the years after a municipality has been amalgamated. At the moment of amalgamation, 
average population increases (e.g., it doubles when two municipalities amalgamate). This 
approach reflects that it is increase in size through amalgamation, not amalgamation as 
such, that is expected to yield economies of scale.  
Table 2.7 presents results of this approach. As we see in first stage regression results, the 
coefficient for the dummy variable Amalgamated is highly significant. The Kleibergen-Paap F-
statistic indicates that our instrument is strong. A possible amalgamation effect should now 
be observable in the coefficient of average population per jurisdiction. However, this is not 
the case (Column 19). 
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Table 2.7: Regressions of total per capita spending: instrumental variable approach 
Control group Amalgamated or almost amalgamated 
 IV estimate 1st stage regression 
Regression number 19 20 
General grant -0.11 0.08 
 (-1.41) (0.99) 
Density 0.15 0.32 
 (0.69) (1.53) 
Ideology (left) 0.02 -0.04 
 (0.92) (-1.55) 
Concentration in council -0.03 -0.02 
 (-1.01) (-0.76) 
Coalition power in council 0.01 -0.02 
 (0.50) (-1.64) 
Pre-election year 0.02 0.02 
 (1.10) (1.02) 
Election year 0.06*** 0.01 
 (2.75) (0.22) 
Post-election year 0.03** 0.00 
 (2.54) (0.09) 
Average population per jurisdiction 0.01  
 (0.53)  
Amalgamated  0.96*** 
  (14.94) 
Year effects Yes Yes 
Municipal fixed effects  Yes Yes 
Municipal time trends Yes Yes 
Observations 1,541 1,541 
Municipalities 135 135 
R2 0.03 0.966 
Kleibergen-Paap F 223.4  
T-values between parentheses, based on robust standard errors clustered by municipality. Variables are 
expressed in logs. * denotes significance at the 10% confidence level, ** significance at the 5% 
confidence level, and *** significance at the 1% confidence level. 
As a second robustness test, we employ a dynamic model which is extended to include 
spatial interaction effects.18 Allers and Elhorst (2011) found evidence of expenditure 
mimicking among Dutch local governments. Failure to include this could lead to omitted 
variable bias. Elhorst (2010) compares a number of different dynamic panel models with 
spatial interaction effects, and specifically evaluates their performance for panels with a 
small time dimension (T=5). He finds that the bias-corrected LSDV (BCLSDV) method from Yu, 
De Jong and Lee (2008) roughly decimates the bias that is found when using a standard LSDV 
method. This bias is even less if the time dimension is larger than 5, as in our case. Therefore 
we will use this model, for which the econometric specification is: 
                                                        
18 Different spatial interaction models exist. A spatial lag model is chosen here because we know from Allers 
and Elhorst (2011) that we should expect direct spatial interactions between Dutch municipalities. 
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ݕ௜௧ = ߛݕ௜,௧ିଵ + ௜ܺ௧ߚ + ߣ ௜ܹݕ௜௧ + ߩ ௜ܹݕ௜௧ିଵ + ߙ௧ܫ௡ + ߟ௜ + ߳௜௧ (3) 
௜ܹ is an n x n spatial weights matrix which is non-stochastic and generates the spatial 
dependence among cross sectional units ݕ௜௧. As each row sums to one, ௜ܹݕ௜௧ is the average 
of ݕ௜௧ in neighboring municipalities. Spatial interaction is included both for the dependent 
variable in the present year t and in the previous year t-1. As with the dynamic non-spatial 
model, we extend model (3) to include a number of amalgamations dummies, which are 
defined above. 
We run the spatial dynamic model for the entire sample. Thus, the control group consists of 
municipalities that were not amalgamated, or that were amalgamated in a different year. 
Reducing the sample to limit the control group would result in too many geographical gaps 
to make spatial analysis useful. Many municipalities would have no or few neighbours 
included in the analysis. Table 2.8 presents the results. No indicator for goodness of fit is 
available for the spatial estimator. Column (21) matches column (18) in table 2.6. Column 
(22) shows the results of the same model, but for a balanced panel. These results can be 
compared with those of the model including a spatial lag in Column (23), which can only be 
estimated for balanced panels. The coefficient for the spatial lag is significantly positive. Per 
capita spending increases with 1 percent when the average level of per capita spending in 
neighbouring municipalities increases with 10 percent. However, the introduction of this 
effect into the model does not affect our results with regard to the amalgamation effects. 
These remain insignificant. We take this as evidence that the absence of any robust effect of 
amalgamation in the dynamic models in tables 2.3 and 2.6 does not result from omitting 
spatial interaction from the model. 
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Table 2.8: Regressions of total per capita spending with spatial lag; dynamic panel data 
model 
Control group All All All 
Balanced panel No Yes Yes 
Regression number 21 22 23 
Apre -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
(0.18)  (-1.33) (-0.34) 
A0-3 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
(0.49)  (0.26) (-0.16) 
A4-10 0.01 0.00 -0.00 
(0.02)  (0.43) (0.12) 
A11+ 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
(0.29)  (0.43) (-0.14) 
Lagged dependent 0.75*** 0.82*** 0.75*** 
(45.79)  (44.50) (45.44) 
Spatial lag   0.10*** 
(4.61)    
Spatial lag on lagged dependent   0.01 
(0.31)   
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,983 2,704 2,704 
Municipalities 387 246 246 
Pseudo-R2 (within) 0.63 0.62  
T-values between parentheses. Variables are expressed in logs. * denotes significance at the 10 percent 
confidence level, ** significance at the 5 percent confidence level, and *** significance at the 1 percent 
confidence level. 
 
2.6 Amalgamation effects for other aspects of local finance 
So far, we have focussed on total per capita spending as the variable of interest and found 
no significant amalgamation effects. In this section, we will use different dependent 
variables to get a more complete view of the effects of amalgamation on local finances. By 
studying the effects on employee numbers and wages, municipal debt levels and tax 
revenues, we might observe that despite total expenditures being unaffected, amalgamation 
effects still do occur in specific areas of local public finances. Alternatively, we might find 
that the absence of an amalgamation effect is consistent regardless of the angle from which 
we approach these finances. 
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Employment and wage costs 
After amalgamation and the merging of two or more municipal organizations, it is not 
expected that employment by the newly formed organization is reduced immediately or in 
the short run. Many employment contracts for civil servants are of indefinite duration, which 
makes terminating those contracts expensive. This decreases the incentive to immediately 
reduce the workforce to the size that would be fully efficient in the long run, given the new 
situation. In addition, mayor wage levels are standardized and are higher for larger 
municipalities. This in itself does not lead to higher wage costs since there is only one mayor 
after amalgamation, but since the mayor wage level functions as a wage ceiling for other 
functions in the municipal organization, this has an indirect upward effect on wage levels in 
general. Moreover, amalgamation is likely to lead to a harmonization of the salary structures 
of all municipalities. Now if for example two civil servants in the same function in different 
municipalities get a different salary, chances are the lower paid one gets a raise and not that 
the higher paid gets a wage cut. Concurrently, non-monetary employee benefits could be 
upgraded to the highest pre-amalgamation standard as well. These two effects could then 
even lead to a temporary increase of wage costs that could undo the effect of efficiency 
gains even in the medium run. 
Table 2.9: Regressions of fulltime employees per capita, static and dynamic panel models  
Model Static Static Static Dynamic Dynamic Dynamic 
Control group Amalgamated 
or almost 
amalgamated 




Regression number 24 25 26 27 28 29 
Apre -0.01 -0.01 -0.03* -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 
 (-0.53) (-0.44) (-1.83) (-0.08) (-0.35) (-0.02) 
A0-3 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.03 
 (0.13) (0.12) (-0.78) (0.37) (-0.23) (0.90) 
A4-10 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.00 -0.03 0.03 
 (0.50) (0.44) (-0.15) (-0.10) (-0.55) (0.95) 
A11+ -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.07 0.01 
 (-0.43) (-0.57) (-0.62) (-0.97) (-1.08) (0.21) 
Lagged dependent    0.85*** 0.88*** 1.04*** 
    (31.22) (33.82) (147.96) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal fixed eff.  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal time 
trends 
Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Observations 1,485 1,111 4,257 1,350 1,010 3,870 
Municipalities 135 101 387 135 101 387 
R2 0.32 0.32 0.57    
Pseudo-R2 (within)    0.12 0.11 0.48 
T-values between parentheses, based on robust standard errors clustered by municipality. Variables are expressed in logs. * denotes 
significance at the 10% confidence level, ** significance at the 5% confidence level, and *** significance at the 1% confidence level. 
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To study these effects, we use data from the ABP pension fund for employees in the 
government and education sectors. Participation in this fund is mandatory for all civil 
servants, meaning that this data set gives us a complete picture of the number of employees 
and the wage budget per municipality.19  
Table 2.9 shows the resuls with both static and dynamic models for the three control groups 
for the number of full time employees (FTE). We see that there is no significant and robust 
amalgamation effect whatsoever. This means that as far as the size of the workforce is 
concerned, there is no sign of a significant reduction even in the long run. However, if wages 
have gone up, this might still be observable in wage budgets. In table 2.10, the results of the 
same regressions with the wage budgets per capita as dependent variable are given. Yet 
again, we see no significant effect of amalgamations. 
Table 2.10: Regressions of paid wages per capita: alternative control groups  
Model Static Static Static Dynamic Dynamic Dynamic 
Control group Amalgamated 
or almost 
amalgamated 




Regression number 30 31 32 33 34 35 
Apre -0.01 -0.01 -0.03** -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 
 (-0.86) (-0.82) (-2.09) (-0.09) (-0.35) (-0.02) 
A0-3 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.01 -0.00 0.03 
 (0.17) (0.13) (-0.67) (0.50) (-0.12) (1.02) 
A4-10 0.03 0.03 0.00 -0.00 -0.03 0.03 
 (0.62) (0.53) (0.00) (-0.08) (-0.52) (0.90) 
A11+ -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.06 0.01 
 (-0.26) (-0.42) (-0.43) (-0.95) (-1.04) (0.17) 
Lagged dependent    0.84*** 0.87*** 1.04*** 
    (29.71) (31.60) (144.75) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal fixed eff.  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal time trends Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Observations 1,485 1,111 4,255 1,350 1,010 3,868 
Municipalities 135 101 387 135 101 387 
R2 0.44 0.41 0.58    
Pseudo-R2 (within)    0.23 0.20 0.48 
T-values between parentheses, based on robust standard errors clustered by municipality. Variables are expressed in logs. * 
denotes significance at the 10% confidence level, ** significance at the 5% confidence level, and *** significance at the 1% 
confidence level. 
 
                                                        
19 Data provided by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. 
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Level of debt  
So far, we have focussed on the spending side of government finances. No significant robust 
amalgamation effect has been found in that area. Theory suggests other approaches as well. 
The common-pool hypothesis predicts that amalgamating municipalities might not (only) 
induce increased spending, but might also increase debt size in the years preceding 
amalgamation. Also, changes in ambition and efficiency might be reflected in debt levels 
after amalgamation. In order to test these hypotheses, we introduce a new dependent 
variable debt per capita. Data for this variable was retrieved from Statistics Netherlands, 
using municipal balances for the period 2005-2011, from which we have taken the sum of 
fixed and current liabilities. 
Table 2.11 shows that the results are in line with the overall results seen so far. Neither 
before, nor after amalgamation, can any effect from amalgamation be observed. We find no 
evidence for the common pool hypothesis.  
 
Table 2.11: Regressions of debt per capita: alternative control groups  
 
Model Static Static Static Dynamic Dynamic Dynamic 
Control group Amalgamated 
or almost 
amalgamated 




Regression number 36 37 38 39 40 41 
Apre -0.06 -0.03 -0.07 -0.08 -0.05 -0.03 
 (-0.58) (-0.38) (-0.64) (-0.71) (-0.56) (-0.27) 
A0-3 -0.08 -0.04 -0.10 -0.09 -0.04 -0.06 
 (-0.63) (-0.29) (-0.74) (-0.60) (-0.41) (-0.52) 
A4-10 -0.15 -0.10 -0.17 -0.20 -0.12 -0.13 
 (-0.97) (-0.67) (-1.04) (-1.33) (-1.01) (-0.89) 
A11+ -0.09 -0.07 -0.13 -0.21 -0.08 -0.09 
 (-0.58) (-0.45) (-0.76) (-1.21) (-0.58) (-0.61) 
Lagged dependent    0.50*** 0.77*** 0.71*** 
    (12.19) (19.95) (23.63) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal fixed eff.  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal time trends Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Observations 904 676 2,629 758 567 2,216 
Municipalities 135 101 387 135 101 387 
R2 0.50 0.63 0.61    
Pseudo-R2 (within)    0.15 0.30 0.27 
T-values between parentheses, based on robust standard errors clustered by municipality. Variables are expressed in logs. * denotes 
significance at the 10% confidence level, ** significance at the 5% confidence level, and *** significance at the 1% confidence level. 
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Tax rates and tax revenues 
The final category of dependent variables that we have taken an interest in, lies on the 
revenue side of the municipal budget. As noted before, taxation possibilities for 
municipalities in the Netherlands are limited, since roughly two thirds of municipal income 
consist of grants from central government. The size of the grant for an municipality is based 
on factors that lie outside of the sphere of influence of the municipalities.  
About 15% of municipal income comes from taxes and user fees and the size of that source 
of income is determined by the local government. Therefore, It is interesting to focus on this 
aspect of local finances since a change in behavior due to increased efficiency might be more 
easily observable in variables that are largely determined by the municipalities themselves. 
Local government is free to decide which taxes will be imposed and what user fees are 
charged, but this freedom of choice is limited to a selection of potential taxes and levies that 
has been determined on a national level. Many taxes are levied in a limited number of 
municipalities (e.g., dog tax, tourist tax, commuter tax) and have been introduced in some 
municipalities and abolished in others during our research period. As a result, they are not 
suitable for our analysis of amalgamation effects. 
Two user fees and one tax have been consistently levied in all municipalities in our research 
period and form a significant source of income for municipalities. Sewer charges and waste 
disposal charges are both user fees that are linked directly to specific public services. The 
total revenues from these fees are not allowed to exceed the associated costs. Hence, the 
freedom in setting the rates for these user fees is limited for municipalities that aim for full 
cost coverage for these public services. The municipal property tax rate can be set freely by 
individual municipalities20, with separate rates for residential and non-residential buildings. 
Local governments can spend the revenues of this tax at their own discretion. 
The data is available from COELO, and is taken for the period 2002-2013 to correspond with 
the period used to analyze expenditures. Since property tax is the only significant tax that is 
set freely by municipalities, our dependent variable focusses on this. We select total 
property tax revenue per capita, which also takes into account property tax revenues levied 
from non-households. 
Table 2.12 shows that property tax revenues appear unaffected by amalgamation. Hence, 
our initial conclusions that amalgamations do not affect public finances are reaffirmed when 
studying different aspects of municipal finances. 
  
                                                        
20 In 2006 and 2007, property tax rates were capped at the municipality level. Furthermore, a national norm 
(‘macronorm’) for the total nationwide growth of property tax revenues is in place, although as of yet no 
immediate measures have been taken when this norm was violated in 2012 and 2013. 
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Table 2.12: Regressions of property tax revenues per capita: alternative control groups  
 
Model Static Static Static Dynamic Dynamic Dynamic 
Control group Amalgamated 
or almost 
amalgamated 




Regression number 42 43 44 45 46 47 
Apre 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.16) (-0.17) (0.21) (-0.24) (-0.03) (0.06) 
A0-3 0.04 0.01 0.04 -0.00 0.02 -0.00 
 (0.63) (0.23) (0.52) (-0.05) (0.36) (-0.02) 
A4-10 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.01 
 (1.07) (0.66) (0.96) (0.06) (0.54) (0.21) 
A11+ 0.07 0.05 0.08 -0.00 0.04 0.01 
 (1.12) (0.73) (1.04) (-0.02) (0.62) (0.21) 
Lagged dependent    0.79*** 0.94*** 0.59*** 
    (13.99) (11.06) (22.19) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal fixed eff.  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal time trends Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Observations 1,265 937 3,681 1,062 778 3,151 
Municipalities 135 101 387 135 101 387 
R2 0.86 0.86 0.82    
Pseudo-R2 (within)    0.79 0.80 0.71 
T-values between parentheses, based on robust standard errors clustered by municipality. Variables are expressed in logs. * denotes significance at 
the 10% confidence level, ** significance at the 5% confidence level, and *** significance at the 1% confidence level. 
 
Robustness test: IV estimation  
When we use the number of FTE’s, wage budget, debt and property tax revenues per capita 
in an IV estimation similar to table 2.7, we see that the absence of significant amalgamation 
effects is robust to this change of methodolgy. The results of these analyses are presented in 
tables 2.13 and 2.14. 
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Table 2.13: Regressions of FTEs and wage sum per capita: instrumental variable approach 
Control group Amalgamated or almost amalgamated  
Dependent variable (per capita) FTEs Wage sum 






Regression number 48 49 50 51 
Average population per jurisdiction 0.01  0.02  
 (0.40)  (0.66)  
Amalgamated  0.95***  0.95*** 
  (15.77)  (15.77) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,485 1,485 1,485 1,485 
Municipalities 135 135 135 135 
R2 0.00 0.961 0.00 0.961 
Kleibergen-Paap F 248.9  248.9  
T-values between parentheses, based on robust standard errors clustered by municipality. Variables are expressed in 




Table 2.14: Regressions of debt and property tax revenues per capita: instrumental 
variable approach 
Control group Amalgamated or almost amalgamated  
Dependent variable (per capita) Debt Property tax revenues 






Regression number 52 53 54 55 
Average population per jurisdiction 0.01  0.01  
 (0.24)  (0.30)  
Amalgamated  0.99***  0.95*** 
  (11.56)  (16.44) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 904 904 1,265 1,265 
Municipalities 135 135 135 135 
R2 0.03 0.960 0.02 0.971 
Kleibergen-Paap F 133.8  270.4  
T-values between parentheses, based on robust standard errors clustered by municipality. Variables are expressed in 
logs. Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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2.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter we consider the effects of municipal amalgamation on several aspects of 
municipal finances. We first focus on total spending per capita, a variable that gives a good 
impression of financial developments in general. With dynamic data panel analysis and 
several dummy variables measuring amalgamation effects in different time periods before 
and after amalgamation, we find that there is no robust significant amalgamation effect. 
Even though we do find a pre-amalgamation effect that borders on insignificance, this result 
does not hold when we use alternative control groups or alternative econometrical 
approaches (instrument variables approach or a dynamic panel including spatial lag).  
Analyses using dependent variables that cover different aspects of municipal finances 
confirm these findings. We have studied spending on personnel by using per capita variables 
measuring the number of FTE’s employed and the wage sum paid by municipalities but no 
amalgamation effects is found there either. The same can be said of the level of debt and the 
revenues of the most important local tax (property tax). For none of these variables, 
amalgamation effects are observed. 
These findings do not settle the debate in the literature with regard to post-amalgamation 
effects, with authors previously having presented evidence of both higher and lower 
spending after amalgamations. The fact that budget cuts for municipalities in the 
Netherlands in the near future are based on expectations of lowered spending after 
amalgamations, raises doubts about the reasoning behind these budget cuts. 
The absence of any evidence of a robust common pool effect (or pre-amalgamation effect) 
does not seem to be in line with several publications that do indeed find such an effect 
(most recently Hansen (2014) in Sweden and Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2013) in Finland). This 
could be due to institutional differences between the studied countries with regard to 
budget rules for municipalities. 
The findings in general do leave room for extended research on the topic, which will be 
presented in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3 - An extended analysis of amalgamation effects 
This chapter is based on Allers and Geertsema (2016). 
In the previous chapter, we have seen that no robust effect of amalgamation on total 
spending is found. Similar results were found when using the number of employees (FTE), 
wage sum, debt level and property tax revenues per capita. The first part of this chapter 
shifts the focus back to our main variable of interest, total spending per capita. 
The results with this dependent variable were unaffected by the chosen control group or 
regression model, and held for all time periods around amalgamation, be it shortly before, 
shortly after or even in the medium or long term after amalgamation. In this chapter, we will 
delve further into these findings too see if they are truly representing the absence of an 
amalgamation effect, or if they are the result of the decision to study the effect on all 
municipalities within the control groups. By differentiating between different types of 
amalgamated municipalities we might observe different effects. 
As a second extension, we study whether amalgamation affects spending on different public 
services as opposed to aggregate spending. We focus on public services that could 
theoretically be expected to be affected by an amalgamation. This approach might produce 
some information on the level of public services that is offered by amalgamated 
municipalities. Finally, we continue our analysis of public service levels by studying 
amalgamation effects on house prices. Theories on capitalization of efficiency gains predict 
that these gains should be reflected in higher house prices. An absence of an effect of 
amalgamation of house prices would therefore indicate that there is no amalgamation effect 
on efficience either. 
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3.1 Does amalgamation affect total spending of certain types of 
municipalities? 
The effect of population size 
As described in chapter 1, compared to those in other countries, Dutch municipalities are 
large. Perhaps economies of scale only exist in small municipalities.21 Moreover, the 
amalgamation effect might differ for municipalities with different characteristics, and this 
effect might even work in opposite directions for different amalgamations. Since our analysis 
so far concerns the aggregate effect, i.e., for all amalgamations, the results might reflect 
both positive and negative effects that cancel out. Therefore, we now test whether the 
amalgamation effect for small municipalities, where economies of scale are more likely, 
differs from that for large municipalities.  
To this end, we introduce four interaction dummies corresponding with our four 
amalgamation dummies. These interaction dummies measure the influence of the 
population size on the size of the amalgamation effect in a certain period. The results for the 
dynamic model and the static model with municipality trends are presented in columns (1) 
and (2) of table 3.1. None of the amalgamation dummies and none of the interaction 
variables have significant coefficients. The relevant effect, however, is the combined effect 
of both amalgamation and population, and cannot be read from the table directly. Instead, 
the amalgamation effect and its confidence intervals for the relevant range of population 
sizes are best presented in a graph. Figure 3.1 presents the combined effect of the 
amalgamation dummies and the interaction with population in the dynamic model.22 The 
marginal effect is drawn as a solid line, while the 95 percent confidence interval lies between 
the dashed lines. If there is a certain population range for which the confidence interval lies 
above or below the x-axis, this can be interpreted as a significant amalgamation effect at the 
5 percent confidence level. Also, if it is possible to draw a horizontal line that lies within the 
confidence interval, this can be interpreted as an absence of a significant interaction effect. 
The vertical bars represent the number of municipalities observed in that population range, 
where we use intervals of 1,000. The amalgamation effects turn out not to vary with 
population size, and the slope of the marginal effect line is nearly horizontal. Thus, we find 
no indication of (dis)economies of scale for small (large) municipalities. Also, we see that the 
post-amalgamation effects are insignificant for the entire population range. Results for other 
control groups are similar, as well as outcomes for the static model with municipality trends. 
                                                        
21 Hanes (2014) found that a negative amalgamation effect on spending in Sweden exists only for municipalities 
below a certain critical size. 
22 The marginal effect of amalgamation on per capita spending is calculated as βଵ + βଶPopulation, where βଵis 
the coefficient of the amalgamation dummy Ax and βଶ the coefficient of the interaction term Population*Ax. 
The standard error is given by ඥvar(βଵ) + Populationଶvar(βଶ) + 2Population cov(βଵβଶ). See, e.g., Brambor et al. 
(2006). 
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Table 3.1: Regression of total per capita spending; static and dynamic panel with 
interaction terms 
Interaction variable Population before amalg. Difference in ideology 
Model Static Dynamic Static Dynamic 
Regression number 1 2 3 4 
Apre -0.60 -0.15 -0.03 -0.03* 
 (-1.34) (-0.38) (-1.27) (-1.82) 
A0-3 -0.61 -0.33 0.01 -0.00 
 (-0.94) (-0.55) (0.18) (-0.06) 
A4-10 -0.68 -0.11 0.02 0.00 
 (-0.94) (-0.16) (0.47) (0.01) 
A11+ -0.67 -0.03 0.03 0.00 
 (-0.91) (-0.04) (0.57) (0.02) 
Interaction with Apre 0.05 0.01 -0.09 0.03 
 (1.29) (0.30) (-1.51) (0.39) 
Interaction with A0-3 0.06 0.03 -0.19 0.02 
 (0.91) (0.57) (-1.55) (0.10) 
Interaction with A4-10 0.06 0.01 -0.23 0.00 
 (0.92) (0.17) (-1.46) (0.02) 
Interaction with A11+ 0.06 0.00 -0.22 -0.01 
 (0.91) (0.04) (-1.29) (-0.04) 
Population before amalg. 0.05 0.01   
 (1.29) (0.30)   
Difference in ideology   -0.09 0.03 
   (-1.51) (0.39) 
Lagged dependent  0.70***  0.70*** 
  (16.78)  (16.68) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal time trends Yes No Yes No 
Observations 1,541 1,339 1,541 1,339 
Municipalities 135 135 135 135 
R2 (within) 0.74  0.74  
Pseudo-R2 (within)  0.67  0.52 
Control group: amalgamated or almost amalgamated. T-values between parentheses, based on robust standard errors 
clustered by municipality. Variables are expressed in logs, except for the political difference variables. * denotes 
significance at the 10% confidence level, ** significance at the 5% confidence level, and *** significance at the 1% 
confidence level. 
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Figure 3.1: Marginal effect of amalgamation on total municipal spending, conditional on 
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We do see that the pre-amalgamation effect bordering on being significant found in chapter 
2 manifests itself in the first panel. For a very small range (approximately 35,000 to 38,000 
after amalgamation) the effect is significant and negative. However, when using different 
control groups (as in table 2.8) the effect is insignificant for the entire range, so as with the 
basic analysis, we find that this result is found not to be robust. 23 
The effect of preference heterogeneity 
The amalgamation of a number of municipalities is not merely a matter of removing internal 
borders and merging the administrative organization. In addition to the territorial and 
organizational changes, multiple local administrations with potentially different political 
preferences will have to form one new administration and set one uniform policy for all local 
issues. This change potentially affects public spending through an increase of local 
ambitions. When different ambition levels for a certain public service exist, it is more likely 
that the highest service level will become the new standard for the entire municipality than 
that service levels will be lowered for certain functions. This effect can work through in every 
single public service, e.g. the maintenance of roads in the former district A might be raised 
to the level of district B, while simultaneously public sports facilities in district B will be 
improved to the level of district A. (Park 2013).  
It is interesting to see whether the absence of an amalgamation effect is the result of a 
combination of this effect, with possible efficiency gains compensating for this increased 
ambition. For municipalities with heterogeneous preferences, efficiency gains are then used 
to increase service levels, resulting in unchanged public spending. Homogeneous 
preferences would not lead to increased ambitions, allowing those municipalities to use 
increased efficiency to reduce public spending. To test whether preference heterogeneity 
affects amalgamation effects, we again use interaction variables. As an indicator for 
preference heterogeneity, various measures are available.  
1. Our variable measuring the political ideology of the parties governing the 
amalgamated jurisdictions is an objective measure. To measure heterogeneity, we 
can calculate the difference between the highest and the lowest value of ideology 
among jurisdictions in the year before they amalgamate. 
2. The same calculation can be done using the ideology of the entire municipal council. 
This includes the parties that are not in the coalition. 
3. Both measures of ideology pay very little attention to the exact composition of the 
coalition or the entire council respectively. For example, a coalition existing of one 
neutral party has the same ideology as a coalition of a right-wing party and an equally 
large left-wing party. We construct another variable that addresses this problem. To 
do this, for an amalgamation of two municipalities, we take the difference between 
the number of seats each party has in both municipalities, and take the sum of those 
                                                        
23 See figure 4A in the appendix for graphical results. 
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differences. Again, for more than three amalgamating municipalities, we take the 
difference between the maximum and the minimum number of seats in any council 
in the year before amalgamation. 
4. This third measure may overestimate actual differences, because it ignores the fact 
that different political parties sharing the same ideology are more interchangeable in 
terms of preferences than two parties of different ideologies. To address this, we 
construct a variable by first grouping the political parties based on ideology (left-
wing, right-wing and neutral), and then calculating the sum of seat differences for 
these groups instead of for the individual parties. 
We have run regressions with all four measures for preference heterogeneity, but since the 
results are virtually identical regardless of the measure chosen, we focus on the results using 
the first one, the differences in political ideology of the parties governing the amalgamating 
jurisdictions. These are given in columns (3) and (4) of table 3.1, and a graphical presentation 
is given in figure 3.2. As with population, we see a small range for difference of ideology 
(0,06 to 0,16) for which the pre-amalgamation effect is significantly negative. However, this 
result is not robust for changes in the control group.24  
  
                                                        
24 See figure 3B in the appendix for graphical results 
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Figure 3.2: Marginal effect of amalgamation on total municipal spending, conditional on 
preference heterogeneity  
Preference heterogeneity (for ideology of the coalition) on the horizontal axis, marginal 
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The effect of the number of amalgamating municipalities 
A last possible factor influencing the amalgamation effect is the number of amalgamating 
municipalities. The larger this number is, the larger the potential savings can be from 
removing redundant components from multiple municipal organizations. As we saw in figure 
2.2, most amalgamations concern two or three jurisdictions. The number of observations for 
amalgamations of four or more municipalities is very small. Hence, a model with interaction 
variables which measure the marginal effect conditional on the number of amalgamating 
municipalities is not suitable. Consequently, we test only whether the effect of 
amalgamating two jurisdictions differs from the effect of amalgamating three jurisdictions.  
To do this, we run regressions in which the original amalgamation dummies have been split 
in two sets. One set (starting with Mun2) takes the value of 1 in the appropriate period only 
when two jurisdictions are amalgamated, the other (starting with Mun3) takes the value of 1 
when three jurisdictions are amalgamated. Table 3.2 presents regression outcomes. 
Amalgamations of more than three municipalities are omitted. Lower and upper limits are 
given for the 95% confidence intervals. We find that there are no significant differences in 
amalgamation effects for any period or model. 
Table 3.2: Amalgamation effect for amalgamations with two and three municipalities 
Control group Amalgamated and almost amalgamated 
Model Static Confidence interval  Dynamic Confidence interval  
  Lower Upper  Lower Upper 
Regression number 5   6   
Mun2 * Apre -0.07** -0.14 -0.00 -0.06 -0.14 0.02 
 (-2.02)   (-1.46)   
Mun2 * A0-3 -0.08* -0.17 0.01 -0.03 -0.14 0.09 
 (-1.83)   (-0.44)   
Mun2 * A4-10 -0.08 -0.18 0.02 -0.03 -0.14 0.08 
 (-1.49)   (-0.54)   
Mun2 * A11+ -0.07 -0.17 0.04 -0.04 -0.16 0.08 
 (-1.22)   (-0.63)   
Mun3 * Apre -0.03 -0.07 0.01 -0.02 -0.07 0.03 
 (-1.45)   (-0.76)   
Mun3 * A0-3 -0.00 -0.11 0.11 0.03 -0.04 0.09 
 (-0.00)   (0.76)   
Mun3 * A4-10 0.02 -0.10 0.15 0.03 -0.05 0.11 
 (0.34)   (0.77)   
Mun3 * A11+ 0.04 -0.09 0.18 0.02 -0.06 0.10 
 (0.60)   (0.54)   
Lagged dependent    0.69*** 0.61 0.77 
    (16.95)   
Municipality time trends Yes   No   
Observations/municipalities 1,345/ 118   1,167/ 118   
R2 (within) resp. Pseudo-R2 0.75   0.68   
Control variables, year effects and municipality fixed effects included. T-values between parentheses, based on robust 
standard errors clustered by municipality. Variables are expressed in logs. * denotes significance at the 10% confidence 
level, ** significance at the 5% confidence level, and *** significance at the 1% confidence level. 
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Hence, there is no evidence suggesting that our failure to find a significant amalgamation 
effect on total spending is the result of averaging out counteracting effects for small and 
large, or homogeneous and heterogeneous, jurisdictions. The number of amalgamating 
jurisdictions does not affect the amalgamation effect either. 
3.2 Changes in service levels 
Finally, it is conceivable that economies of scale do occur, but that they are not used to 
reduce spending but to increase public service levels. In that case, the amalgamation effect 
will not be observable in the total level of municipal spending, but should be observable in 
the composition thereof, or in the appreciation of local public services. We investigate this 
possibility by analyzing this composition, and the effect of amalgamation on house prices. 
Composition of spending 
The spending category where we would most expect economies of scale is administration. 
Spending on administration of Dutch municipalities includes remunerations for mayor, 
aldermen and members of the municipal council, and spending on staff and administrative 
support of these administrators and politicians. Amalgamations reduce the number of 
aldermen, council members and mayors. We do indeed find a significantly negative  
Table 3.3: Regressions of share of spending categories in total spending (control group: 
amalgamated or almost amalgamated) 
Dependent variable Share of administration Share of culture & recreation 
Model Static Dynamic Static Dynamic 
Regression number 7 8 9 10 
Apre 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.02 
 (0.21) (-0.19) (0.82) (0.52) 
A0-3 -0.22** -0.12 0.07* 0.03 
 (-2.09) (-1.63) (1.69) (0.83) 
A4-10 -0.24** -0.14* 0.06 0.02 
 (-2.17) (-1.76) (1.12) (0.55) 
A11+ -0.27** -0.18** 0.05 0.03 
 (-2.30) (-2.18) (0.96) (0.51) 
Lagged dependent  0.68***  0.60*** 
  (16.48)  (16.95) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal time trends Yes No Yes No 
Observations 1,515 1,311 1,514 1,309 
Municipalities 135 135 135 135 
Pseudo-R2 (within)  0.41  0.27 
R2 0.50  0.40  
     
T-values between parentheses, based on robust standard errors clustered by municipality. Variables are expressed in 
logs. * denotes significance at the 10% confidence level, ** significance at the 5% confidence level, and *** 
significance at the 1% confidence level. 
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amalgamation effect on long run spending on administration in both the static and the 
dynamic model (table 3.3). This points to economies of scale in this specific area. Any savings 
on administration might have been used on different spending categories, perhaps raising 
public service levels. However, as the share of administration outlays in total spending is 
small, it cannot be ruled out a priori that savings on administration have been used to 
reduce total spending, but that the effect is too small to be picked up by our regressions. 
If efficiency gains have been used to improve public services, one would expect higher 
spending levels in policy fields where spending is largely discretionary and aimed at 
providing services to the public. In the Netherlands, spending on many municipal tasks is 
driven by national guidelines or economic developments (e.g., welfare). In contrast, 
spending on culture & recreation is characterized by a large degree of freedom for local 
politicians. Moreover, this category consists of outlays for services that benefit citizens 
directly. Columns (9) and (10) of table 3.3 present regressions with the share of spending on 
culture & recreation as dependent variable. In the dynamic model, we find no significant 
effect of amalgamations on this share. In the static setting with municipality trends, we do 
find a positive effect immediately after amalgamation, that borders on significance. There is 
no long term effect, though. If there were any efficiency gains from amalgamation, these 
should not disappear over time, which leads us to the conclusion that even the results for 
the static model are no indication of efficiency gains. 
Capitalization of changes in service levels 
Instead of focussing on individual spending categories, it is also possible to investigate 
whether amalgamation might raise the overall level of public services. If amalgamated 
municipalities improve service levels, this should make them more attractive to live in, 
ceteris paribus. Housing supply in the Netherlands is inelastic (Vermeulen and Rouwendal 
2007). If a municipality becomes more attractive, local demand for housing will increase, 
resulting in rising house prices (Oates 1969; Brueckner 1979). Recent empirical studies in 
England and the Netherlands indicate that intergovernmental grants are fully capitalized into 
house prices with a lag of about two years (Hilber et al. 2011; Allers and Vermeulen 2013). 
We would expect the same to happen with funds that become available as a result of 
economies of scale. Thus, changes in quality-adjusted average house prices per municipality 
and per year seem a better indicator for changes in service levels that variables like birth 
rate that have been used in some previous amalgamation studies.25   
We first ran a hedonic regression based on a panel data set which, for 1.7 million 
transactions in 1995-2013, contains sale prices and dates along with a rich set of house 
characteristics (number of rooms, floors, kitchens, bathrooms; year of construction, 
                                                        
25 Hedonic price analysis has been used by many authors to measure the value of local public services. For 
examples see Zheng, Sun and Wang (2014) and the references provided therein. 
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proximity of busy roads, garden orientation, etc.).26 The regression results were used to 
estimate the average house price per municipality and per year, keeping every other variable 
constant. The result is a price reflecting the value of a location in a particular municipality in 
a particular year. We next take this average house price as the dependent variable in a 
regression with amalgamation dummies, fixed effects, year effects and individual 
municipality trends on the right hand side. We have dropped municipalities if less than 20 
transactions took place every year.  
Table 3.4 shows that amalgamations do not raise house prices significantly. If anything, there 
is some weakly significant evidence of temporary negative amalgamation effects. Thus, we 
find no evidence supporting the improved public services hypothesis.  
Table 3.4: Regressions of average house price 
Control group Amalgamated or almost amalgamated 
Dependent variable Average house price 
Model Static Dynamic IV 1st stage 
regression 
Regression number 19 20 21 22 
Apre -0.01* -0.00   
 (-1.68) (-0.29)   
A0-3 -0.02* 0.01   
 (-1.82) (0.99)   
A4-10 -0.02* 0.02   
 (-1.67) (1.19)   
A11+ -0.01 0.02   
 (-0.88) (1.13)   
Lagged dependent  1.45***   
  (83.12)   
Average population per jurisdiction   -0.00  
   (-0.88)  
Amalgamated    0.95*** 
    (16.39) 
Control variables No No No No 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal time trends Yes No Yes Yes 
Observations 1,464 1,340 1,464 1,464 
Municipalities 122 122 122 122 
Pseudo-R2 (within)  0.92   
R2 (within)  0.94   0.96 
Kleibergen-Paap F   269  
T-values between parentheses, based on robust standard errors clustered by municipality. Variables are expressed 
in logs. * denotes significance at the 10% confidence level, ** significance at the 5% confidence level, and *** 
significance at the 1% confidence level. 
                                                        
26 Data have been kindly made available by the Dutch Association of Realtors (Nederlandse Vereniging van 
Makelaars o.g. en vastgoeddeskundigen, NVM). For regression results see Table 3C in the Appendix. 
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3.3 Conclusion 
This chapter presented a more extensive analysis of amalgamation effects on the main 
dependent variable measuring local finances, being total expenditures. The conclusion that 
there are no robust amalgamation effects whatsoever, based on our initial analyses as 
presented in chapter 2, might raise several questions with regard to the interpretation of 
those results.  
One objection might be that we have taken all municipalities and differentiated them only 
based on the question whether or not they had (almost) been amalgamated. This produces 
aggregate results that do not take into account characteristics that might influence the 
direction and extent of potential amalgamation effects. However, in this chapter we found 
that the initial findings where not a result of counteracting effects cancelling each other out. 
We have differentiated municipalities using interaction variables based on population size 
and ideological heterogeneity and the results of chapter 2 have proven to be robust. 
A second objection might be that focussing on total spending provides an incomplete picture 
of the effects of amalgamation, and that efficiency, measuring both output (public service 
delivery) and input (municipal budgets), gives a much more inclusive insight in these effects. 
Total output of a municipality is extremely hard to measure, but we have taken two 
alternative approaches to shed some light on this topic. We have focused on spending on 
culture and recreation, a spending category which is highly observable to voters and which 
we might expect to grow when increased efficiency of the municipality on the whole would 
set free funds. However, we have found no amalgamation effect there. The second approach 
entails the use of changes in house prices within the municipality, with the idea that 
increased efficency would make a municipality more attractive to live in, putting upward 
pressure on these prices. Again, we have found no amalgamation effect using this approach 
either. 
This leads us to conclude that the absence of amalgamation effects is not only highly robust 
and applicable to municipalities with different characteristics, but also to the efficiency of 
municipal public service delivery.   




Figure 3A: Marginal pre-amalgamation effect of amalgamation on total municipal 
spending, conditional on population, for the alternative control groups of amalgamated 
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Figure 3B: Marginal pre-amalgamation effect of amalgamation on total municipal 
spending, conditional on difference in ideology, for the alternative control groups of 
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Table 3C: Hedonic regression of house prices 
The average house price per municipality per year is obtained by regressing the log of the transaction price in 
2013 euros on dwelling characteristics and municipality/year-specific fixed effects. Dwelling characteristics are 
differentiated for single family units and apartments whenever relevant. For robustness, we exclude 
municipalities where less than 20 houses were sold in any single year. Using 50 as a cut-off point does not 
change the results much. The price index is constructed from the fixed effects. 
Lot area (log) 0.153*** 
 (109.6) 
Living area (log) 0.156*** 
 (49.32) 
Living area (log)) 0.714*** 
 (59.44) 
Log volume (house) 0.346*** 
 (103.1) 
Log volume (apartment) 0.0381*** 
 (6.685) 
2 rooms (house) -0.0294*** 
 (-4.469) 
3 rooms (house) -0.0204*** 
 (-3.726) 
4 rooms (house) -0.00365 
 (-0.674) 
5 rooms (house) 0.00806 
 (1.488) 
6 rooms (house) 0.0271*** 
 (5.003) 
7 rooms (house) 0.0629*** 
 (10.73) 
2 rooms (apartment) 0.0281*** 
 (5.168) 
3 rooms (apartment) 0.0299*** 
 (4.447) 
4 rooms (apartment) -0.0209*** 
 (-2.578) 
5 rooms (apartment) -0.000931 
 (-0.143) 
6 rooms (apartment) 0.0354*** 
 (4.496) 
7 rooms (apartment) 0.0555*** 
 (5.338) 
2 balconies (house) 0.0596*** 
 (46.87) 
3 balconies (house) 0.0970*** 
 (10.23) 
2 dormers (house) 0.0237*** 
 (34.06) 
3 dormers (house) 0.0349*** 
 (14.65) 
Roof terrace (house) 0.0264*** 
 (24.59) 
Roof terrace (apartment) 0.0443*** 
 (20.41) 
Scullery (apartment) 0.0926*** 
 (36.18) 
2 bathrooms (house) 0.0184*** 
 (13.57) 
3 bathrooms (house) 0.0769*** 
 (36.59) 
4 bathrooms (house) 0.139*** 
 (21.09) 
2 bathrooms (apartment) 0.0463*** 
 (11.83) 
3 bathrooms (apartment) 0.181*** 
 (27.30) 






Semi-detached house 0.0280*** 
 (17.80) 
Townhouse (end of block) 0.00846*** 
 (12.41) 
Duplex house 0.0669*** 
 (45.74) 
Detached house 0.124*** 
 (61.17) 
Simple house -0.0551*** 
 (-31.44) 
Canal house 0.241*** 
 (25.62) 
Manor house 0.111*** 
 (55.50) 






Country house 0.160*** 
 (58.93) 
Downstairs apartment -0.0964** 
 (-2.571) 




Porch flat -0.165*** 
 (-4.245) 
Flat with walkway access -0.173*** 
 (-4.624) 
Care flat -0.0969*** 
 (-2.623) 
Built between 1906-1930 -0.0609*** 
 (-20.60) 
Built between 1931-1944 -0.0578*** 
 (-11.07) 
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Built between 1945-1959 -0.0831*** 
 (-20.90) 
Built between 1960-1970 -0.119*** 
 (-24.99) 
Built between 1971-1980 -0.0895*** 
 (-19.09) 
Built between 1981-1990 -0.0398*** 
 (-8.767) 
Built between 1991-2000 0.0171*** 
 (3.601) 
Built after 2001 0.0431*** 
 (7.009) 
Low quality apartment -0.0514*** 
 (-15.08) 
High quality apartment 0.107*** 
 (34.87) 
Interior maintenance state  0.0674*** 
good (66.37) 
Interior maintenance state  0.114*** 
excellent (66.64) 
Interior maintenance state  -0.0369*** 
bad (-17.36) 
Exterior maintenance state  0.0480*** 
good (40.53) 
Exterior maintenance state  0.0580*** 
excellent (33.85) 
Exterior maintenance state  -0.0530*** 
bad (-20.88) 
2 types of isolation 0.0174*** 
 (26.30) 
3 types of isolation 0.0152*** 
 (16.89) 
4 types of isolation 0.0112*** 
 (9.292) 




Garden at North -0.0150*** 
 (-15.51) 
Garden at Northeast -0.0121*** 
 (-9.997) 
Garden at East -0.0149*** 
 (-15.91) 
Garden at Southeast -0.00535*** 
 (-4.510) 
Garden at South -0.00367*** 
 (-4.062) 
Garden at Southwest -0.000430 
 (-0.399) 
Garden at West -0.00783*** 
 (-8.325) 
Garden at Northwest -0.00857*** 
 (-7.109) 
Garden to be laid out 0.00118 
 (0.424) 
Garden in neglected state 0.0456*** 
 (26.70) 
Garden in normal state 0.0815*** 
 (45.99) 
Garden in fine state 0.0690*** 
 (38.79) 
Parking space present 0.0266*** 
 (25.09) 
Carport (no garage)  0.0522*** 
present (46.70) 
Garage (no carport)  0.0693*** 
present (95.00) 
Carport and garage  0.0746*** 
present (57.02) 
Garage for multiple cars  0.0671*** 
present (52.33) 
Indoor parking space -0.0181*** 
 (-15.96) 
Situated downtown 0.0588*** 
 (43.03) 
Situated near busy road -0.0287*** 
 (-20.46) 
Situated near forest 0.0578*** 
 (22.17) 
Situated near water 0.0544*** 
 (34.29) 
Situated near park 0.0165*** 
 (12.36) 
Situated with free view 0.00612*** 
 (8.352) 
Sold in February 0.00526*** 
 (7.725) 
Sold in March 0.0111*** 
 (15.39) 
Sold in April 0.0168*** 
 (21.67) 
Sold in May 0.0222*** 
 (26.99) 
Sold in June 0.0248*** 
 (26.81) 
Sold in July -0.0137*** 
 (-14.36) 
Sold in August -0.0112*** 
 (-12.21) 
Sold in September -0.00658*** 
 (-7.690) 
Sold in October -0.00526*** 
 (-6.850) 
Sold in November -0.00272*** 
 (-3.973) 






Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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Chapter 4 - The effect of intermunicipal cooperation on efficiency  
This chapter is based on Allers et al. (2015). 
Up to this point, our empirical research has focused on the effects of municipal 
amalgamation. There are other ways local government can increase the scale on which 
public services are produced: they can choose to cooperate with other governments or 
choose to contract out to or partner up with the private sector. Contracting out requires a 
competitive market, which does not exist for many services for which local government is 
responsible. Where it has been applied, results have often been disappointing (Bel et al. 
2010). The same goes for public-private partnership (Andrews and Entwistle 2010). 
Therefore, this chapter focuses on intermunicipal cooperation and its effects on efficiency. 
Paragraph 4.1 provides an overview of empirical research on intermunicipal cooperation. 
Next, we will give an insight of the institutional background relevant to this topic. Since 
general background information on municipalities in the Netherlands has already been given 
in paragraph 2.1, we will focus on intermunicipal cooperation and borrowing by and lending 
to local governments here. Paragraph 4.3 presents the method and data used. Paragraph 4.4 
offers the results of our basic analysis while paragraph 4.5 elaborates and presents results of 
further analysis of the characteristics of intermunicipal cooperation and their effects on the 
results presented. 
4.1 Empirical research on intermunicipal cooperation 
Although intermunicipal cooperation is a wide-spread phenomenon (Hulst and Van Montfort 
2012), it has not been extensively studied. 
Empirical studies of the effects of cooperation or amalgamation often focus on spending 
levels. Higher spending does not necessarily point to increased inefficiency, however. It may 
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simply reflect rising public service levels. Unfortunately, efficiency of municipalities is hard to 
measure, because output is often ill-defined, heterogeneous and hard to quantify. Empirical 
studies in this field suffer from two fundamental problems (Geys and Moesen 2009). They 
have to make do with the scarce output indicators available, which usually are at best crude 
proxies for the true level of public good provision. Moreover, they rely on strong 
assumptions (e.g., regarding the cost function), or they are vulnerable to data errors (if data 
envelopment analysis is used to measure efficiency). Because all previous econometric 
papers on the effects of intermunicipal cooperation (reviewed in Bel and Warner 2015) focus 
on a service for which output is easy to quantify (waste), the first problem does not 
necessarily apply to them. Indeed, output and quality are controlled for in some of these 
studies (e.g., Bel and Costas 2006 and Zafra-Gómez et al. 2013).  
Our approach is completely different. Whereas previous studies on the effects of 
intermunicipal cooperation on costs cover all costs of providing a single service, we focus on 
a single cost in a broad range of public services. We exploit a unique micro-level dataset on 
the price both municipalities and intermunicipal organizations pay for a standard 
commodity: credit. We compare interest rates on loans to Dutch intermunicipal 
organizations, amalgamated municipalities, and municipalities that were not amalgamated. 
The credit risk for these loans is identical (i.e., zero). Our rich dataset allows us to control for 
loan characteristics that influence interest rates. Consequently, any differences we find point 
ceteris paribus to differences in efficiency, without having to rely on strong assumptions 
inherent in the approaches chosen by previous studies.  
4.2 Institutional background 
Intermunicipal cooperation 
Intermunicipal cooperation is an important phenomenon in the Netherlands. Municipalities 
often cooperate to perform specific tasks, ranging from waste collection to administering 
social welfare benefits. To this end, many intermunicipal organizations have been created. 
Cooperation is often aimed at reaping economies of size. Other reasons to cooperate are 
that some municipalities are simply too small to perform every task independently, or that 
the catchment area of a public service exceeds the municipality’s boundaries. 
Intermunicipal organizations may take different forms (Hulst and Van Montfort 2007). There 
are no limitations with respect to the number of cooperative arrangements, and 
municipalities are free to choose different partners for each (except for some cases where 
cooperation is mandatory). The Joint Provisions Act (Wet gemeenschappelijke regelingen) 
enables municipalities to create public bodies, which are separate administrative entities 
that may employ staff, own assets, borrow money, etcetera. A public body is governed by a 
general board containing members of municipal councils or aldermen from the participating 
municipalities. The general board can delegate its authority to an executive board. It is the 
general board, not the councils of the participating municipalities, that adopts the public 
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body’s budget. Municipal councils may express their views on the proposed budget, but the 
public body’s board decides. 
Municipalities may also create public companies under private law. The management of 
public companies enjoys almost complete autonomy vis-à-vis local government (Hulst and 
Van Montfort 2007). The advisory and the executive boards may (partly) consist of 
representatives of the participating jurisdictions, but they must act in the interest of the 
company and are not accountable to the municipal councils.  
Apart from these two main forms, several other types exist, e.g., foundations and informal 
clubs of government officials in charge of specific public services. The exact number of 
intermunicipal organizations is not known; no central register exists. However, every 
municipality participates in several, if not scores, of cooperative arrangements. 
Local government borrowing 
There are no legal limits to the amounts municipalities or intermunicipal organizations can 
borrow (Allers 2015). Although Dutch municipalities are legally obliged to present balanced 
budgets, this does not rule out deficit financing. Because municipalities use accrual 
accounting, expenditures to acquire assets do not burden the budget in the year of 
acquisition for the full amount, but are spread out over the economic life of the assets, in 
the form of interest and depreciation, in a way similar to that in business accounting. Thus, a 
municipality may borrow while at the same time presenting a balanced budget.  
There is no default risk associated with loans to municipalities. Dutch municipalities never go 
bankrupt (Allers forthcoming), and neither do intermunicipal public bodies. Article 12 of the 
Financial Relations Act (Financiële verhoudingswet) stipulates that a municipality may apply 
for a supplementary grant if revenues are significantly and structurally insufficient to cover 
necessary outlays, while local tax rates are sufficiently high. This explicit bailout guarantee 
enables Dutch municipalities to borrow cheaply. According to Article 2.8 of the Regeling 
solvabiliteitseisen kredietrisico en grote posities Wft 2010 (“Rules on solvability 
requirements, credit risk and large positions”), the credit risk associated with loans to 
municipalities and intermunicipal public bodies is on par with loans to the central 
government. Such loans are not subject to solvency requirements, i.e., the bank is not 
required to hold additional capital if it holds more of these loans. 
Unlike public bodies, public companies sometimes go bankrupt, although this happens 
rarely. Some of the loans to such companies are guaranteed by local governments. Those 
loans are not subject to solvency requirements as credit risk is zero. If necessary, the bank 
will contact the municipality acting as a guarantor and receive its money back. Non-
guaranteed debt of public companies does carry credit risk, and is excluded from this study. 
Loans must be approved by the municipality’s board of aldermen or the general board of the 
intermunicipal organization, or by a civil servant mandated by the relevant board. A 
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representative of the municipality or the intermunicipal organization contacts the client desk 
of one or more financial institutions, sets out the specifics of the requested loan, and is 
offered an interest rate. After selecting the best offer, the loan is quickly arranged. 
Lending to local government 
Two Dutch banks specialize in loans to local governments, BNG Bank and NWB bank. Both 
enjoy triple-A ratings.27 Apart from these banks, of which shares are held by the central 
government and subnational governments, municipalities and intermunicipal organizations 
may borrow from commercial banks. As bank loans are easily available, local governments 
do not normally issue bonds. Credit ratings of individual municipalities are not available. 
In 2012, the most recent year for which this figure is available, subnational public bodies 
(mostly, but not exclusively, intermunicipal bodies) had a combined debt of 3.6 billion 
euro.28 Countrywide data on debt of other intermunicipal organizations is not available. In 
the same year, intermunicipal organizations owed BNG Bank 3.5 billion euro and NWB Bank 
0.5 billion euro.29 Intermunicipal public bodies account for 1 billion (BNG) and 0.2 billion 
(NWB) of these totals. Outstanding debt of municipalities totaled 46 billion euro in 2012.30 
Of this, 27 billion euro was owed to BNG Bank and 7 billion euro to NWB Bank.31 
We interviewed representatives of BNG Bank on the way interest rates are set.32 To make 
long term loans, BNG Bank borrows money on the international capital market. The 
proceeds of the bond issues, paying a fixed interest rate, are swapped to Euribor (European 
inter-bank offered rates) immediately to mitigate interest risk. Short term funding is 
obtained through the money market. Short term lending rates are based on Euribor rates, 
long term lending rates are based on swap rates. Before the start of every business day, the 
bank builds a so called pricing yield curve by first connecting the funding interest rates for 
different maturities, and then adding surcharges for profit and cost (which may depend on 
principal and maturity), a liquidity premium (if applicable) 33 and a surcharge for cost of 
capital (“usage of balance sheet”).  
The pricing yield curve gives a norm price on which the actual interest rate of a loan is based. 
Actual interest rates usually differ from this norm price; they are a result of negotiations 
between lender and borrower. E.g., lower rates may be offered to attract extra business on 
days with ample supply, or when the interest rate on the international market has gone 
down during the day, after the pricing yield curve has been fixed. Borrowers who are aware 
                                                        
27 In 2013, one of the three major credit rating agencies downgraded the rating of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands to AA+. As a result, the rating of these banks was downgraded as well by this agency.  
28 Source: Statistics Netherlands. 
29 Sources: internal data BNG Bank; NWB (2013). 
30 Source: Statistics Netherlands. This includes debts to non-banks (e.g., unpaid bills). 
31 Sources: internal data BNG Bank; NWB (2013). 
32 We interviewed a member of the Board of Directors and persons working at the client desk of the bank. 
33 A liquidity premium was introduced during the financial crisis of 2008, when international credit market 
liquidity was low. 
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of the latter are likely to secure better deals than borrowers who do not spend time to 
collect market information. 
Sometimes long term loans have a forward start. This means that the borrowed money is 
not made available on the day the loan is arranged (and the interest rate set), but at a later 
date. Interest rates on loans with a forward start are usually higher, because pricing is based 
on immediately borrowing by the bank on the capital market, until maturity, and lending to 
a third party against a usually lower rate for the period until the loan starts. The resulting 
loss in the first period has to be compensated by a premium on the interest rate during the 
second period, leading to a higher interest rate. A forward start can be attractive because it 
gives the borrower certainty about the interest to be paid, even though the loan has not 
actually started yet, or because the borrower anticipates rising interest rates. It may also be 
convenient for intermunicipal organizations where loans have to be approved by a board 
that does not meet very often. It that case, the board may also give permission to borrow 
money on certain conditions at a later moment.  
4.3 Theory and hypotheses 
Risk and interest rate 
Suppose that a bank can choose between two options. This first is a risk-free investment 
earning a return of ܴ∗ = 1 + ݎ∗. The second option is a loan to a borrower ݅ who will default 
with probability ௜ܲ, at interest rate ݎ௜. In case of default, the bank recoups a proportion ߬ of 
the loan, but this is accompanied by extra costs ܶ, such as judicial or procedural costs. 
Assume ܶ is fixed, i.e., independent of ܮ, the size of the loan. If borrower ݅ does not default, 
the bank lends ܮ and gets back ܮܴ௜, so the return of investment is ܴ௜. In case of default, the 




Risk neutrality implies that the loan should have the same expected return as the risk-free 
investment: 











For Dutch municipalities and public bodies, which never default, ௜ܲ  is zero and the required 
rate of return equals the risk-free rate of return: 
 ܴ௜
௠௨௡௜௖௜௣௔௟௜௧௬ = ܴ௜
௣௨௕௟௜௖ ௕௢ௗ௬ = ܴ∗ (3) 
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For public companies, default risk is positive, but credit risk is zero, as their debt is 
guaranteed by default-free municipalities.34 This means that ߬, the proportion of the return 
that the lender recoups in case of default, equals 1. However, some effort might be needed 
(and thus costs ܶ be made) in case of financial distress for the borrower, despite the official 
legal mechanisms in place for such situations. Thus, for public companies, equation (2) 
simplifies into: 
 ܴ௜




The above implies that there is no theoretical reason for banks to require different interest 
rates for loans to municipalities and to public bodies (equation 3). Loans to public companies 
may carry more interest if enforcing loan guarantees in case of default is costly (equation 4). 
However, interest rates are not determined solely by the rate of return the bank requires; 
they are the result of negotiations between lender and borrower. The outcomes of these 
negotiations are the result of the effort put in by both parties, where the effort put in by the 
borrower is expected to be determined by the extent to which efficiency is monitored.  
The role of monitoring 
The decision to outsource tasks to private firms complicates the decision making process. 
Agency theory describes how monitoring, sanctions and awards are needed to align the 
agent’s objectives with those of the principal (e.g., Fama and Jensen 1983). This carries 
transaction costs with it. Stewardship theory suggests that such costs are lower when tasks 
are carried out by other governmental organizations, as objectives are likely to be more 
aligned in that case (Van Slyke 2007). However, it seems that monitoring in such cases is less 
productive, because of the difficulty to induce service-providing governments to react to the 
contracting government’s evaluation of the services provided, due to weak sanctioning 
power (Marvel and Marvel 2008).  
Corporate governance theory suggests that, in the case of intermunicipal cooperation, there 
is an additional problem: dispersed ownership (Sørensen 2007). Public services provided 
through intermunicipal cooperation are financed from a common pool; hence, the costs are 
shared with other municipalities. Consequently, when a municipality decides on the amount 
of effort (cost) that should be put into monitoring an intermunicipal organization, it will take 
into account that any gains from making that effort will only partly benefit the municipality 
itself, since they will be shared with all other participants. This is likely to result in a level of 
monitoring that is lower than that for the operations of the municipality itself. According to 
corporate governance theory, this incentive for undermonitoring will lead to inefficient 
service provision. It allows functionaries of intermunicipal organizations to engage in, e.g., 
budget-maximizing behavior (Niskanen 1971).  
                                                        
34 We abstract from operational risk, which includes, e.g., the possibility that contractual stipulations prove 
unenforceable or have been incorrectly documented. 
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However, the public choice literature provides a different perspective, with a different 
outcome. According to this literature, citizens are unable to effectively oversee their elected 
representatives. This allows politicians to collect rent: they can divert public resources to 
further their own goals, e.g., to improve their chances to be reelected. Decision making in 
intermunicipal organizations is at a greater distance from politicians than decision making in 
municipalities. As a result, it is more difficult for politicians to exploit the organization’s 
resources as transaction costs are higher (Sørensen 2007).  
Thus, theoretically, intermunicipal cooperation may result in less efficiency because of 
reduced monitoring (agency theory), and to greater efficiency because of less political 
meddling (public choice). The net effect is uncertain. However, in the case we study, 
borrowing money, political meddling seems to be less relevant. It is hard to see how 
politicians could benefit from intermunicipal organizations paying unnecessarily high interest 
rates. We hypothesize that intermunicipal cooperation reduces monitoring effort and 
therefore leads to higher interest costs:  
Hypothesis 1: intermunicipal organizations pay higher interest rates than 
municipalities. 
Amalgamation, which is an alternative to cooperation, might also affect monitoring effort. It 
is conceivable that recently amalgamated municipalities are not able to monitor their 
borrowing activities as well as municipalities that did not amalgamate. Amalgamation is an 
arduous process that may have severe disruptive effects on managerial behavior and 
organizational outcomes, e.g., because of poor staff morale, loss of managerial expertise due 
to increased turnover, and work overload (Andrews and Boyne 2012). On the other hand, 
amalgamation might have a beneficial effect on efficiency. Existing organizations usually 
have well established ways of doing things, which may have become outdated. 
Amalgamation forces organizations to reconsider procedures and operations, possibly 
resulting in the adoption of more efficient practices (Hansen et al. 2014). Again, the net 
effect is uncertain. We hypothesize that the first, efficiency-reducing, effect dominates, but 
that it is smaller than for cooperation: 
Hypothesis 2a: in the first few years after amalgamation, municipalities pay 
higher interest rates than not (recently) amalgamated municipalities. 
Hypothesis 2b: interest rates paid by recently amalgamated municipalities are 
lower than those paid by intermunicipal organizations. 
We expect that the extent to which intermunicipal organizations pay higher interest rates 
than municipalities depends on two crucial characteristics of such organizations. The first is 
legal form. Because public bodies are default-free and public companies are not, different 
risk-free rates of return apply (see equation 3 and 4, respectively). For public companies, 
costs T might be involved in case of default (equation 4). Thus, we expect public companies 
to pay higher interest rates than public bodies: 
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Hypothesis 3: interest rates paid by public companies are higher than those paid 
by public bodies. 
The second characteristic of intermunicipal organizations that may affect the interest rate is 
the number of cooperating municipalities. Several papers argue that inefficiency due to 
common pool effects increases with the number of participants, a phenomenon called the 
“law of 1/n” (Weingast 1979; Weingast et al. 1981; Primo and Snyder 2008). Originally, this 
law is based on models where (i) individual legislators care mainly about the public projects 
that flow into their own districts (or benefit their inhabitants), (ii) funding of public projects 
is fixed and not connected to individual projects and (iii) all projects proposed are passed. 
Although empirical findings supporting this hypothesis are presented by several authors 
(e.g., Baqir 2002; Bradbury and Stephenson 2003), others have raised questions.  
Primo and Snyder (2008) argue that the effect of the number of participants depends on 
factors like the degree of publicness of the goods provided. They also give examples of cases 
where a “reverse law of 1/n“ may hold. This is in line with Tornell and Lane (1999), who 
propose a non-monotonic relationship between the number of competing powerful groups 
in an economy and the growth rate of the efficient sector: a shift from n = 1 to n = 2 reduces 
efficiency, while, starting at n ≥ 2, a further increase reduces power concentration and 
improves outcomes. Tornell and Lane (1999) model a situation where each participant has 
an outside option. This means that, for the most efficient organization as well as for others, 
participating must be at least as attractive as leaving. As n goes up, inefficiency must be 
curbed to satisfy that condition. As municipalities are free to join or leave intermunicipal 
organizations, this model is relevant here.  
The public choice literature provides another reason to expect a “reverse law of 1/n“ to 
apply. As describe above, according to this literature, decision making in intermunicipal 
organizations may be more efficient because it is further removed from politicians than 
decision making in municipalities. As the number of participants grows, it gets more difficult 
for politicians from one participating unit to exploit the organization’s resources, as 
transaction costs are higher. This suggests a “reverse law of 1/n“. 
Thus, theoretically, a higher number of cooperating municipalities may result in lower 
efficiency because of reduced monitoring, and to higher efficiency because exit should 
remain unattractive and because of less political meddling. The net effect is uncertain. 
Leaving an intermunicipal organization and setting up an operation on one’s own will 
probably be unattractive in many cases, especially where service provision is capital-
intensive. Therefore, we hypothesize that the first effects dominates.  
Hypothesis 4: the interest rate paid by intermunicipal organizations is higher if 
the number of participating municipalities is higher (i.e. the “law of 1/n” holds). 
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4.4 Method and data 
Our units of observation are individual loans. We have data on four types of loans with fixed 
interest rates made by BNG Bank, which is the market leader in this field: 
1) Short term loans (up to one year) where payment of principal and interest is due at 
maturity. 
2) Long term loans where amortization and interest is paid in equal installments 
(Annuity).  
3) Long term loan where the principal is paid back in equal installments (Linear). 
4) Long term loans where the principal is paid back at maturity (Bullet). 
Purchase or sale of loans, refinancing, restructuring, consolidation of loans and loans with no 
fixed interest rate or standard amortization schedules are left out of our selection. We select 
loans to municipalities and public bodies, which both never default in the Netherlands, and 
loans to public companies which are guaranteed by municipalities. So, all loans in our sample 
are officially free of credit risk. 
Interest rates vary a lot over time and over amortization schemes. In order to compare 
interest rates of different loans, we relate them to reference interest rates that apply to the 
same dates and amortization schedules. Our dependent variable is the interest rate 
differential (IRD), defined as the relative difference between the actual interest rate ݎ௝  on 
loan ݆ and the reference interest rate ݎ௥௘௙: ܫܴܦ௝ =
௥ೕି௥ೝ೐೑
௥ೝ೐೑
. We apply a relative measure 
because different loan types have different interest rates, and because interest fluctuates 
considerably over time. The IRD may be interpreted as follows: if, e.g., intermunicipal 
organizations have an average IRD that is 0.05 higher than that of municipalities, then, other 
things being equal, they spend 5 percent more on interest payments.35 
We use the interest rate indicated by BNG Bank’s pricing yield curve as the reference 
interest rate. Although the bank keeps records of pricing yield curves for many years back, 
these data are not available for all possible maturities. For long term loans, reference rates 
based on the bank’s pricing yield curve are available for the most common maturities only: 
both 5 and 10 years for bullet loans, 5, 10, 15, 20 and 25 years for loans with linear 
                                                        
















.  As the average value of 
௥ೝ೐೑
௥೘ೠ೙೔೎೔೛
 in our sample 
is 1.02, this factor will usually be negligible. Thus, if we find a difference in IRD of 0.05, that implies that 5.1 
percent more is paid on interest (0.05 × 1.02 × 100%).  
72  Chapter 4 
amortization and 10, 15, 20 and 25 years for loans with annuity amortization.36 We select 
loans for which reference rates are available, and exclude loans with less common maturities 
from our basic analysis. In our sensitivity analysis, we will check whether this affects the 
results. 
For each loan, BNG Bank creates a paper file and a record in its computer system. We were 
allowed to use data from the latter, for 1997–2013. For short term loans, however, data is 
available for 2006-2013 only, because the bank’s (computerized) administration does not 
allow going further back in time. For each loan, we have data on the identity of the borrower 
and on the loan characteristics that influence interest rates. These include date of contract, 
amortization schedule, principal borrowed, maturity and forward start (number of days 
between setting the contract and the effective start of the loan).  
At this point, we have to decide whether or not to control for such loan characteristics in our 
regressions. It could be argued that borrowers should choose loan characteristics which 
minimize interest payments, under the restriction that enough funds are available at the 
moments these are needed. Controlling for loan characteristics would then eliminate 
inefficiencies resulting from poor treasury management. For municipalities, loans are not 
usually linked to specific investments. Rather, the municipality’s treasurer reviews the entire 
capital needs of his or her organization and borrows accordingly. Loan characteristics such as 
amortization schedule, principal borrowed, maturity and forward start can then be chosen 
to minimize interest payments. Intermunicipal organizations, however, usually borrow 
money for specific projects. Thus, their choice with respect to such characteristics is more 
limited. For that reason, we decide to control for loan characteristics. In that way, we 
compare interest paid on equivalent loans. In our regressions, we use principal, maturity and 
forward start as controls, and run separate regressions for different amortization schedules. 
In order to allow for non-linearity, the square of these variables is also included. 
Furthermore, we include year dummies to control for nationwide factors influencing IRDs.  
Data taken from the bank’s administration are combined with data collected through a 
survey of intermunicipal organizations. We collected data on the number of participating 
municipalities, on the field of activity and on their legal form. Not all of these variables are 
constant over time; especially the number of partners may vary as municipalities join, leave 
or amalgamate. For some organizations, we were unable to collect all data for all relevant 
years. It proved especially difficult to gather data for the earlier years of our research period. 
We define number of partners as equal to 1 in case of loans to municipalities and equal to 
the number of participating municipalities for loans to intermunicipal organizations. 
For all municipalities, we collected data on amalgamations. We construct two dummy 
variables: one indicating whether a municipality has been amalgamated in the year of the 
loan or up to 3 years before, and one indicating whether it has been amalgamated 4-8 years 
                                                        
36 For 5 year loans with linear amortization, reference interest rates are available from July 16, 1999 onward. 
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before the loan was made. This way it is possible to discriminate between short run and long 
term effects of amalgamation. 
Figure 4.1 shows the frequency distribution of IRDs for municipalities and for intermunicipal 
organizations. Although most observations are in the range [-0.1, 0.1], the distribution 
exhibits long tails on both sides. That might be problematic, e.g., in case these long tails 
result from data errors, especially if systematic differences exist between municipalities and 
municipal organizations. To investigate this, we accessed the paper files of the ten loans with 
highest IRDs and the ten loans with lowest IRDs, both for short term loans and for long term 
loans, and both for municipalities and for intermunicipal organizations, i.e., 80 loans in total. 
Table 4.1 summarizes the results. For long term loans, a forward start is the most common 
reason for an extremely high IRD (six out of ten cases, for both municipalities and 
intermunicipal organizations). In two cases, this coincided with a price guarantee, where 
intermunicipal organizations pay extra to secure the right to borrow at a certain IRD in a 
certain period. A small loan size may also result in a high IRD, as the administrative costs of 
making a loan are fixed. 
 




Long term loans 
High IRD   
Forward start 6 6 
Small loan 0 4 
Price guarantee 0 2 
Mistake (too high interest rate offered & 
accepted) 1 0 
Data error 3 0 
Low IRD   
Low rate offered because of market 
conditions 10 9 
Data error 0 1 
Short term loans 
High IRD   
Small loan 9 0 
Price guarantee 0 9 
Data error 1 1 
Low IRD   
Large loan 10 6 
Mistake (too low interest rate offered) 0 2 
Strong bargaining position borrower 0 2 
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Figure 4.1: Frequency distribution of IRDs for municipalities and for intermunicipal 
organizations (percentages) 
 
One high IRD was the result of a mistake made by the client desk of the bank, and three 
outliers proved to be data errors (in the computerized data we use). For long term loans, the 
reason for very low IRDs is, apart from one data error, that the bank sometimes offers 
interest rates below the reference rate given by the pricing yield curve, e.g., when market 
rates drop during the day (the pricing curve is fixed before business starts, early in the 
morning).  
For short term loans, small loan size and price guarantee explain most of the very high IRDs; 
there was one data error. Very low IRDs are caused by large loan sizes, mistakes made by the 
bank’s client desk, and, in two cases, a borrower with a strong bargaining position. In these 
cases, the representative from the intermunicipal organization which took up the loan had 
recently negotiated cheap, large loans for a municipality, and demanded the same low IRD, 
which the bank accepted. 
The only systematic difference between municipalities and municipal organizations we find 
among these outliers is that the latter sometimes pay a premium in order to get a price 
guarantee. This is not observed in our dataset, so we cannot control for it in our regressions. 
In most cases, outliers are related to forward start and loan size, which we do control for. 
However, the number of data errors is rather high among outliers. In order to avoid results 
being driven by outliers, we exclude observations where the absolute value of IRD exceeds 
0.25 from our main analysis. In our sensitivity analysis, we will check whether our results are 
robust for dropping or changing this threshold. 
Table 4.2 presents descriptive statistics. Our dataset contains 11,307 observations, of which 
10,313 are loans to 433 different municipalities, and 994 are loans to 113 different 
intermunicipal organizations. In those 113 intermunicipal organizations, 389 different 
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics 
 N mean st.dev. min max 
Entire sample 
Interest rate 11,307 2.095 1.924 0.050 6.820 
Principal (million euro) 11,307 7.663 12.25 0.091 278.495 
Maturity (years) 11,307 5.977 8.413 0 25 
Forward start (days) 11,307 25.34 129.4 0 2,193 
Number of partners 11,307 1.543 2.399 1 35 
IRD 11,307 -0.012 0.084 -0.250 0.250 
Intermunicipal organizations 
Interest rate 994 1.684 1.561 0.090 5.620 
Principal (million euro) 994 4.911 8.273 0.010 66.086 
Maturity (years) 994 3.782 6.502 0 25 
Forward start (days) 994 15.59 74.20 0 923 
Number of partners 994 7.178 5.539 2 35 
IRD 994 0.027 0.072 -0.248 0.250 
This table describes the observations used in regressions reported in tables 4.3-4.5, i.e., excluding observations with an 
absolute value of IRD exceeding 0.25 and excluding observations with uncommon maturities. 
 
this chapter offers a detailed breakdown of the dataset by loan type and borrower 
characteristics.  
4.5 Comparing interest paid by intermunicipal organizations, amalgamated 
municipalities and not-amalgamated municipalities 
 
In this section, we test whether there exist significant differences between IRDs of 
intermunicipal organizations and municipalities (hypothesis 1), municipalities which are 
amalgamated and municipalities which are not (hypothesis 2a), and intermunicipal 
organizations and amalgamated municipalities (hypothesis 2b). In the next section, we 
examine whether intermunicipal organizations’ characteristics affect IRDs. 
It is obvious from figure 4.1 that IRDs are often higher for intermunicipal organizations. 
However, this may be due to differences in loan characteristics or timing. To test whether 
the type of organization really matters, we conduct a number of regression analyses. 
Reported standard errors are robust for heteroscedasticity and for correlation between 
observations for identical organizations. 
Basic results 
Table 4.3 shows regressions of IRDs on a dummy that takes the value of one if the loan was 
made to an intermunicipal organization, and on a number of control variables. The first 
column includes all loans in our dataset. Columns (2)-(5) concern specific types of loans. In 
many cases, the control variables are highly significant, especially for long term loans which 
are more heterogeneous than short term loans. Overall, the variables included in the 
regression explain differences in IRDs quite well.  
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Table 4.3: Regressions of IRD: basic analysis 
Loan type All loans Short 
term 
Annuity Linear Bullet 
Regression number 1 2 3 4 5 
      
Intermunicipal organization 0.0430*** 0.0476*** 0.0450*** 0.0271*** 0.0437*** 
 (0.00405) (0.00537) (0.00999) (0.00330) (0.00842) 
Principal (million euro) -0.000838** -0.000897* -0.000917 -0.000603*** -0.000602** 
 (0.000399) (0.000505) (0.000795) (0.000155) (0.000243) 
Principal squared 3.33e-06 3.49e-06 2.73e-05 6.22e-06*** 3.46e-06 
 (3.03e-06) (3.38e-06) (2.25e-05) (2.06e-06) (3.70e-06) 
Maturity (years) -0.00170*** -0.00607 -0.00850*** 0.00194***  
 (0.000542) (0.0134) (0.00299) (0.000661)  
Maturity squared 5.10e-05*** 0.00365 0.000238*** -5.61e-05*** 4.58e-05 
 (1.68e-05) (0.00842) (8.45e-05) (1.89e-05) (4.30e-05) 
Forward start (days) 0.000210*** 0.00158 0.000215*** 0.000195*** 0.000339*** 
 (1.41e-05) (0.00142) (1.37e-05) (1.40e-05) (4.45e-05) 
Forward start squared -6.14e-08*** -4.38e-05 -7.03e-08*** -4.62e-08*** -2.07e-07*** 
 (1.01e-08) (6.08e-05) (9.50e-09) (8.10e-09) (4.90e-08) 
      
Observations 11,307 6,822 309 3,676 500 
R-squared 0.206 0.160 0.709 0.695 0.674 
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Year dummies included. * denotes significance at the 10% confidence 
level, ** significance at the 5% confidence level, and *** significance at the 1% confidence level. 
 
It is time to the central question of this chapter: do intermunicipal organizations pay higher 
interest rates than municipalities? The answer is surprisingly straightforward. The 
coefficients of the intermunicipal organization dummy are positive and highly significant for 
all loan types. On average, the IRD for intermunicipal organizations is 0.027 (linear 
amortization) to 0.048 (short term loans) higher than it is for municipalities. Intermunicipal 
organizations pay 3-5 percent more interest on equivalent loans. This confirms hypothesis 1.  
Thus, presumably, intermunicipal organizations could pay less interest, but no doubt this 
would require more effort (collecting market information; negotiating). Would that be cost 
effective? A rough calculation can put this issue into perspective. For intermunicipal 
organizations in our sample, average loan size is 4.9 million euro and the average interest 
rate is 1.7 percent (table 4.2). Thus, yearly interest paid on the average loan amounts to 
83,000 euro. Paying 3-5 percent more in interest means paying 2,500 – 4,000 euro more 
annually. Over 3.8 years (average maturity, table 4.2) that amounts to 10,000-15,000 euro 
per loan. Assuming wage costs of 100,000 euro (rather generous) and 228 working days per 
year (the Dutch average), 10,000 euro buys 23 days of staff. Thus, spending an extra couple 
of hours or even days in order to secure a lower interest rate would be a rewarding 
investment indeed. This suggests that intermunicipal organizations borrow inefficiently. 
Table 4.4 reports estimates of similar regressions as those underlying table 4.3, but with two 
amalgamation dummy variables added (coefficients of control variables are not reported).  
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Table 4.4: Regressions of IRD on cooperation and amalgamation 
Loan type All loans Short term Annuity Linear Bullet 
Regression number 6 7 8 9 10 
      
Intermunicipal organization 0.0424*** 0.0464*** 0.0468*** 0.0272*** 0.0437*** 
 (0.00419) (0.00564) (0.00930) (0.00331) (0.00842) 
Amalgamated 0-3 years before -0.00334 -0.0119 0.0140 0.00129 8.50e-05 
 (0.00593) (0.00993) (0.0105) (0.00122) (0.00411) 
Amalgamated 4-8 years before -0.00461 -0.00757 0.000540 -0.000200 0.000217 
 (0.00485) (0.00790) (0.00442) (0.00145) (0.00355) 
      
Observations 11,307 6,822 309 3,676 500 
R-squared 0.206 0.161 0.713 0.695 0.674 
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Control variables (see table 5.3) and year dummies included. * denotes 
significance at the 10% confidence level, ** significance at the 5% confidence level, and *** significance at the 1% 
confidence level. 
 
The coefficient of none of these is significant for any of the loan types. Municipal 
amalgamation does not affect IRDs, neither in the short run nor in the long run. Thus, 
hypothesis 2a, which states that amalgamation temporarily leads to higher interest rates, is 
rejected. Moreover, this confirms hypothesis 2b, that amalgamated municipalities have 
lower IRDs than intermunicipal organizations. 
Sensitivity analysis 
We test the robustness of the findings in three ways. First, we re-run the regressions 
including uncommon maturities for which no reference interest rates are available, using 
interpolated values for reference interest rates. Secondly, we drop municipalities that do not 
participate in at least one of the intermunicipal organizations we study from the analysis. 
Finally, we allow previously excluded observations with an IRD above 0.25 or below -0.25 in 
our regressions, and apply different thresholds. 
Because reference interest rates for long term loans are only available for the most common 
maturities, we excluded observations with other maturities from the analysis. This may have 
affected our conclusions. In order to check for this potential disturbance, we now include all 
maturities. To find the reference interest rates for non-common maturities, we linearly 
interpolate the reference rates available. E.g., we find the reference rate for a 12 year loan 
by interpolating the rate for a 10 year loan and that of a 15 year loan. For relatively short 
terms, we interpolate between the 1 year Euribor rate and the lowest available swap 
reference rate. For long term loans, over 10 years for bullet loans and over 25 years for 
other long term loans, we use the reference rate for 10 years and 25 years, respectively. 
Table 4B in the Appendix presents the results of regressions similar to those in table 4.4, but 
including observations with non-standard maturities. Columns 2 of both tables are identical, 
because reference rates are available for all short term loans. The R-squared values are 
somewhat lower in table 4B, which is not surprising as our method of interpolating and 
extrapolating reference interest rates is rather crude (yield curves not normally being linear). 
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The coefficients of the intermunicipal organization dummy are hardly affected, though. Now, 
we do find a significant short-term effect of amalgamation, but only at the 10 percent 
confidence level, and only for bullet loans. We conclude that our basic results are not 
affected by the exclusion of loans with non-standard maturities. 
It might be argued that the decision to cooperate may not be independent of a 
municipality’s efficiency. E.g., efficient municipalities could be less likely to cooperate 
because they already enjoy low costs, or are more likely to cooperate because they are more 
attractive partners. In that case, we would be comparing intermunicipal organizations, which 
comprise relatively (in)efficient municipalities, with a group of both inefficient and efficient 
municipalities. However, the intermunicipal organizations included in our database have 
participants from 389 different municipalities, while the total number of municipalities was 
572 in 1997 and 408 in 2013. Thus, the majority of municipalities participates in the 
intermunicipal organizations studied. Still, as a robustness check, we dropped municipalities 
that do not participate in at least one of the intermunicipal organizations covered in our 
analysis and ran the regressions in table 4.4 again. The results are virtually identical (see 
table 4C in the Appendix). 
In order to prevent outliers from influencing our results, we excluded observations with an 
IRD exceeding 0.25 or under -0.25 from our regressions. We now test whether our 
conclusions change by including these observations, or by setting a lower threshold. Table 
4D in appendix 4 shows results of regressions similar to those in table 4.3, reporting only the 
coefficients of the intermunicipal organization dummy and the number of observations. 
Column (1) presents coefficients from regressions where observations with extreme IRDs are 
not excluded. Column (2) presents coefficients from the main analysis as reported in table 
4.3, excluding IRDs above 0.25 or below -0.25. We see that including extreme observations 
strongly increases the coefficient for short term loans, while the coefficients for the other 
loan types are hardly affected. In columns (3)–(5), we exclude observations with an absolute 
IRD above 0.15, 0.10 and 0.05, respectively. Obviously, the coefficients are downwardly 
affected, but they stay positive and highly significant in all cases. Thus, our results are not 
driven by IRDs of a specific magnitude. 
4.6 Effect of intermunicipal organizations’ characteristics on IRDs 
Having established that intermunicipal organizations pay higher interest rates than 
municipalities, and that municipal amalgamation does not affect interest rates, we now turn 
to possible relevant characteristics of intermunicipal organizations. Table 4.5 presents 
regression results for intermunicipal organizations only. Thus, municipalities are excluded 
from these regressions. As extra control variables we add dummies representing the fields in 
which these organizations are active. That is because in some fields, a particular legal form 
or number of participants is more prevalent than in others. The control variables concerning 
individual loan characteristics (as shown in table 4.3) are included as well, but we do not 
report their coefficients. 
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Table 4.5: Regressions of IRD of intermunicipal organizations 
Loan type All loans Short 
term 
Annuity Linear Bullet 
Regression number 11 12 13 14   15 
      
Legal form: public body 0.00214 0.00263  0.00655  
 (0.0120) (0.0140)  (0.0125)  
Inverse of number of partners 
(1/n) 
-0.0295 -0.0152 -0.484 -0.0118 -0.0863 
 (0.0383) (0.0586) (3.585) (0.0259) (0.0545) 
Field: welfare provision -0.0226 -0.0172 0.190 -0.0509***  
 (0.0190) (0.0211) (1.849) (0.0128)  
Field: work provision for 
disabled 
-0.00734 0.00449 -0.328 -0.0365*** -0.0427** 
 (0.00978) (0.0102) (0.383) (0.0103) (0.0155) 
Field: environmental services 0.00806 0.0241** 0.0350 -0.0223* -0.0194 
 (0.0107) (0.0102) (0.435) (0.0129) (0.0246) 
Field: public health -0.00559 -0.0145  -0.0166 0.00632 
 (0.0131) (0.0240)  (0.0151) (0.0415) 
Field: public safety -0.00975 -0.00673 -0.286 -0.0399*** -0.0579*** 
 (0.0147) (0.0217) (0.558) (0.0117) (0.0152) 
Field: business development 0.0123 0.0138   -0.00455 
 (0.0187) (0.0202)   (0.0130) 
      
Observations 889 631 25 197 36 
R-squared 0.095 0.081 0.959 0.386 0.970 
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Controls and year dummies included. Observations where legal 
form is missing are excluded. * denotes significance at the 10% confidence level, ** significance at the 5% 
confidence level, and *** significance at the 1% confidence level. 
 
First, we consider legal form. Because public companies can (and sometimes do) go bankrupt 
and public bodies cannot, lenders might want to charge the former higher interest rates in 
order to cover costs associated with enforcing loan guarantees (equation 4). One might even 
argue that our result that intermunicipal organizations pay higher interest rates may be 
driven partly by this reason. In that case, we would expect public companies to pay higher 
interest rates than public bodies (hypothesis 3). In table 4.5 we test whether the legal form 
of intermunicipal organizations affects the IRD. Our dataset does not contain any annuity or 
bullet loans to public companies (see table 4A in the Appendix), which explains the blanks in 
those columns. For the other loan types, the coefficients of the dummy variable public body 
are far from significant. That implies that there is no difference in interest rates compared 
with public companies. Thus, we find no evidence supporting hypothesis 3. That is not 
entirely surprising. Defaults of public companies are exceptional in the Netherlands. 
Moreover, when interviewing officials of BNG Bank, we were informed that the costs of 
retrieving a loan in such a case are negligible, as the municipalities that guaranteed the loan 
involved pay up swiftly.  
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Next we consider the number of participants (n) which, in our dataset, can be as high as 35 
(table 4.2). In order to directly test the “law of 1/n”, we include 1/n in the regressions. For 
none of the loan types we find a significant coefficient (table 4.5). If we enter n, rather than 
1/n, into the regressions, the coefficient for linear loans is significant at the 10 percent 
confidence level; for other loan types, the coefficients are again insignificant (not shown in 
table 4.5). Thus, hypothesis 4 is not supported. Intermunicipal organizations pay higher 
interest rates, but this is not linked to the number of cooperating partners. 
The coefficients of the control variables representing fields of activity do not point to 
consistently higher interest rates paid by organizations active in specific fields, although 
some coefficients are significant for one or two loan types. Note that, for some combinations 
of field of activity and loan type, we have few or even no observations (see table 4A in the 
Appendix).  
4.7 Conclusions 
This chapter presents our study on the effects of intermunicipal cooperation on efficiency. 
Theory predicts different, counteracting, effects that may occur when the production of a 
public service gets assigned to an intermunicipal organization. Whereas agency theory 
predicts that bureaucracy might increase and misalignment of interests could decreasedd 
efficiency, public choice theory foresees a reduction of political meddling when public 
service production is not under the direct influence of local politicians, which improves 
efficiency. We have used a novel approach to measure efficiency, by comparing interest 
rates paid for identical loans by both municipalities and intermunicipal organizations.  
We find that interest rates paid by intermunicipal organizations are significantly higher than 
those paid by municipalities. All possible explanatory variables for this difference are 
controlled for in our analysis. This leads us to conclude that the observed differences can 
only be the result of a difference in negotiation effort. Apparently, intermunicipal 
organizations are less inclined to put an efficient amount of effort in negotiations about 
interest rates. This points towards less efficiency oriented operations within intermunicipal 
organizations, an outcome that can be theoretically explained by the fact that the latter 
organizations are less closely monitored than in-house operations. There is no reason to 
believe that the process of finding loans at the most favorable terms would be an exception 
to other processes with regard to the degree that efficiency is pursued. Thus, these results 
suggest that less priority is being given to effiency optimization by intermunicipal 
organizations in general. The findings are thus in line with agency theory as described above. 
 
  




Table 4A: Number of observations by amortization schedule 
 
This table describes the observations used in regressions reported in tables 5.3-5.5, i.e., excluding observations 
with an absolute value of IRD exceeding 0.25 and excluding observations with uncommon maturities. 
 
 All loans Short term Annuity Linear Bullet 
  
Intermunicipal organization 994 698 28 231 37 
Municipality, amalgamated 0-3 years before 640 289 23 309 19 
Municipality, amalgamated 4-8 years before 915 530 19 326 40 
Municipality, not recently amalgamated 8,758 5,305 239 2,810 404 
Total 11,307 6,822 309 3,676 500 
  
 Intermunicipal organizations: field of activity 
Welfare provision 41 36 2 3 0 
Work provision for disabled 529 404 3 116 6 
Environmental services 70 37 5 27 1 
Public health 43 19 0 21 3 
Public safety 98 29 16 47 6 
Business development 120 115 0 0 5 
Other 93 58 2 17 16 
Total 994 698 28 231 37 
  
 Intermunicipal organizations: legal form 
Public body 799 553 25 185 36 
Public company 90 78 0 12 0 
Unknown 105 67 3 34 1 
Total 994 698 28 231 37 
 
Table 4B: Regressions of IRD with observations with interpolated reference interest rates 
included 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All loans Short term Annuity Linear Bullet 
      
Intermunicipal organization 0.0421*** 0.0464*** 0.0417*** 0.0294*** 0.0511*** 
 (0.00378) (0.00564) (0.00869) (0.00306) (0.00652) 
Amalgamated 0-3 years before -0.00132 -0.0119 0.0147 0.00110 0.0185* 
 (0.00520) (0.00993) (0.0109) (0.00148) (0.00943) 
Amalgamated 4-8 years before -0.00258 -0.00757 0.00390 -0.000668 0.0161 
 (0.00469) (0.00790) (0.00496) (0.00162) (0.00991) 
      
Observations 12,643 6,822 448 4,121 1,252 
R-squared 0.206 0.161 0.585 0.648 0.453 
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Controls and year dummies included. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
82  Chapter 4 
Table 4C: Regressions of IRDs with only municipalities that participate in intermunicipal 
organizations included in regressions 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All loans Short term Annuity Linear Bullet 
      
Intermunicipal organization 0.0398*** 0.0438*** 0.0500*** 0.0267*** 0.0441*** 
 (0.00468) (0.00636) (0.00952) (0.00329) (0.00914) 
Amalgamated 0-3 years before 0.000734 -0.00620 0.0210 0.00162 -0.000906 
 (0.00719) (0.0110) (0.0129) (0.00138) (0.00587) 
Amalgamated 4-8 years before -0.00399 -0.00632 0.000377 0.000474 0.00519 
 (0.00564) (0.00848) (0.00536) (0.00190) (0.00389) 
      
Observations 8,715 5,405 235 2,737 338 
R-squared 0.208 0.168 0.748 0.689 0.664 
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Controls and year dummies included.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 4D: Regressions of IRD with observations with absolute value of IRD above threshold 
dropped 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 No threshold IRD<=0.25 IRD <=0.15 IRD <=0.1 IRD <=0.05 
All loans 
Intermunicipal organization 0.120*** 0.0430*** 0.0310*** 0.0205*** 0.0102*** 
 (0.0360) (0.00405) (0.00265) (0.00193) (0.00106) 
Observations 14,222 11,307 9,962 8,859 6,819 
 
Short term loans 
Intermunicipal organization 0.156*** 0.0476*** 0.0319*** 0.0187*** 0.00624*** 
 (0.0449) (0.00537) (0.00339) (0.00248) (0.00125) 
Observations 9,695 6,822 5,569 4,593 3,035 
 
Annuity 
Intermunicipal organization 0.0445*** 0.0450*** 0.0369*** 0.0378*** 0.0216*** 
 (0.0100) (0.00999) (0.00984) (0.00868) (0.00480) 
Observations 312 309 292 267 229 
 
Linear 
Intermunicipal organization 0.0296*** 0.0271*** 0.0270*** 0.0224*** 0.0158*** 
 (0.00438) (0.00330) (0.00322) (0.00264) (0.00164) 
Observations 3,704 3,676 3,615 3,528 3,155 
 
Bullet 
Intermunicipal organization 0.0426*** 0.0437*** 0.0402*** 0.0304*** 0.0216*** 
 (0.00898) (0.00842) (0.00728) (0.00396) (0.00367) 
Observations 511 500 486 471 400 
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. Controls and year dummies included. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Chapter 5 - Conclusion 
The potential efficiency gains of scaling up the production and provision of local public 
services are of great interest to both scientists and policy makers. The theory in this field 
describes many possible effects of scaling up, both positive and negative, for both 
productive and allocative efficiency, but overall theory remains ambiguous on the question 
which effects prevail for various jurisdiction sizes. This dissertation presents empirical 
studies that shed some light on two of the instruments for scaling up: municipal 
amalgamation and intermunicipal cooperation. In this final chapter the main findings of this 
work are presented, along with the implications of these findings for policy makers. In 
addition, several avenues for further research are discussed. 
5.1 Municipal amalgamations 
The most rigorous instrument for increasing local jurisdiction size is municipal amalgamation 
(also consolidation or merger), which combines multiple municipalities into one. This 
instrument has been applied by many governments in recent and less recent history, in 
many cases in the form of a single so-called ‘big bang’ procedure, meaning that a substantial 
part of all municipalities are amalgamated according to a nationally coordinated plan. 
Strikingly, these amalgamations do not appear to have led municipalities in relatively similar 
countries (like Western European countries) to converge to a certain specific size range.   
This, of course, is in line with the theoretical ambiguity on effects of scale and size. Some 
theories predict that productive efficiency increases with size, mainly caused by less than 
proportional growth of fixed costs and increased opportunities for specialization and to a 
lesser degree by increased bargaining power and improved accountability mechanisms. On 
the other hand, larger jurisdictions are prone to bureaucracy, due to higher coordination and 
communication costs. Indirectly, the fact that if jurisdictions are larger also means that there 
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are less jurisdictions, leads to reduced competition between municipalities to outperform 
each other (so-called yardstick competition) and thus to less productive efficiency. 
For allocative efficiency also, theory proposes counteracting effects of scale increase. Larger 
jurisdictions lead to a reduction in potential interjurisdictional externalities, enabling better 
policy decisions based on all relevant effects, improving allocative efficiency. On the other 
hand, larger jurisdictions allow for less possibilities for inhabitants to change local policy 
through voting. As a second disadvantage, we see that multiple smaller jurisdictions are 
better able to match inhabitants’ preferences in different local policies than one jurisdiction 
setting a single local policy. The fact that if jurisdictions are larger there are less jurisdictions, 
implies that scaling up leads to a decrease in variation of local policies. Assuming a large 
variation in inhabitants’ preferences, this reduces the match between preferences and 
policy, lowering allocative efficiency. 
Empirical research on the effects of municipal amalgamation has led to mixed conclusions so 
far. Some studies have found that spending increases after amalgamation (in Switzerland, 
Denmark and Finland) whereas other studies have led authors to conclude that spending is 
reduced (in Israel and Germany). Spending can also be affected if politicians are keen on 
depleting reserves or incurring debt shortly before financial assets are combined by the 
amalgamation. This so-called common pool effect has also been found in some studies (from 
Denmark, Sweden and Finland).  
In chapters 2 and 3 we presented our research on the effects of municipal amalgamations. 
This research adds to the existing literature in terms of data used and methodology. The 
literature has so far focused on a limited number of individual cases, or on the effects of a 
big bang amalgamation operation (meaning a number of coordinated, simultaneous 
amalgamations). We study amalgamations in the Netherlands for an extended period of 
time, during which a small number of municipalities have been amalgamated (almost) every 
year. This unique panel data set allows for optimal isolation of the amalgamation effect from 
other temporal effects that would influence spending in all municipalities, amalgamated or 
not. We introduce the use of dynamic panel data analysis in this field and apply various 
robustness tests among which the inclusion of spatial effects.  
We have found no robust evidence of any effect of amalgamations on per capita spending, 
before or after amalgamation. These findings are unaffected when we include annexations 
(amalgamations with a dominant partner) or use alternative sets of amalgamation dummies 
and control variables. As a robustness test, we have also used different research setups 
based on an instrumental variable approach and a spatial dynamic panel setup, and again 
the findings have proven to be robust. Studying other variables such as the number of 
employees, total wages of civil servants and debt per capita confirm the outcome that 
municipal finances as a whole are unaffected by amalgamation. We have not found an effect 
on property tax revenue per capita either.  
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In chapter 3 we presented an extended analysis of these findings by investigating a number 
of possible explanations for the apparent absence of an amalgamation effect. Firstly, it is 
conceivable that our findings are caused by the fact that all municipalities have been studied 
as one group. If there are different, counteracting amalgamation effects for municipalities 
with different characteristics, this might not have been observed if these effects cancel each 
other out. To study this possibility, we repeated our analyses on spending per capita, but 
differentiated the effect using interaction variables. First, we interacted the amalgamation 
dummies with the population size after amalgamation, based on the hypothesis that for 
smaller municipalities economies of size should be more likely than diseconomies of size, 
whereas for larger municipalities the reverse should be expected. However, this 
differentiation rendered no different results than the original analysis. Our second 
differentiation was based on the degree to which the average ideology of amalgamating 
municipalities’ councils differs. Theoretically, amalgamating municipalities with 
heterogeneous preferences are expected to increase spending more than amalgamating 
municipalities with homogeneous preferences. However, the results of an analysis 
differentiating on variables measuring this heterogeneity did not support this hypothesis. 
The second extension deals with the possible critique that spending per capita does not per 
se measure efficiency of a municipality. It is conceivable that economies of size do occur, but 
that amalgamated municipalities decide to improve public service levels instead of 
decreasing spending. This possibility has been looked into using two different approaches. 
First, we have studied categories of spending instead of aggregate spending, and focussed 
on the spending category that is most likely to show efficiency gains (administration) and the 
spending category that is most relevant with regard to providing services highly observable 
to the public (culture and recreation). Although we did observe a decrease of spending on 
administration after an amalgamation, spending on culture and recreation remains 
unaffected. The second approach focusses on house prize developments, based on the 
mechanism of capitalization which implicates that if public services in a municipality are 
improved without local taxes being raised, the houses in that municipality will increase in 
value. However, we did not observe any significant changes in house prices after 
amalgamations. This has led us to conclude that there is no evidence of any efficiency gains 
being directed towards improvement of local public services.  
Overall, with the exception of an effect on spending on administration (which is apparently 
too small to have any significant effect on total spending), we have found no evidence of a 
significant, robust amalgamation effect on local public finances or public services. 
Policy implications 
In the introduction of this thesis, we highlighted the ambition of the Dutch Rutte II 
administration to stimulate municipal amalgamation and to reduce the size of grants from 
national to local government, based on assumptions about efficiency gains from increasing 
average size of municipalities. Financial gains have not been the only motive for the 
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administration to engage in stimulating amalgamations. Instead, the decentralization of 
tasks in the social domain and the need for improvement of the administrative capacity of 
municipalities are declared to be the main motive for these policies. However, substantial 
efficiency gains have been factored in and budgeted for the medium to long run.  
We have found no empirical evidence in support of the assumed efficiency gains. Hence, we 
conclude that it is unwise for governments to steer towards municipal amalgamations for 
financial motives. If and when amalgamations are deemed desirable for other reasons, 
efficiency gains should not be taken as a given and financial projections should be made with 
appropriate caution. We have studied amalgamations that were decided on enjoying 
substantial local public support, either based on a bottom up approach or at least taking into 
account local preferences by consulting local administrations. This implies that our 
conclusions are even more relevant for policies that put external pressure from higher level 
governments on local governments, leading to amalgamations that would not take place 
without that pressure. Municipalities involved in these kinds of amalgamations are less likely 
to make the most of their situation than most of the municipalities we studied, making 
chances for efficiency gains even smaller. 
5.2 Intermunicipal cooperation 
The discussion on what is an optimal size or size range for municipalities encompasses more 
than questions of administrative size alone. In the Netherlands and in most other countries, 
municipalities can choose to cooperate with other municipalities for the production and/or 
delivery of public services. This means that, for those public services that are produced 
through intermunicipal cooperation, the administrative scale is not equal to the operational 
scale. For these public services, a municipal amalgamation is bound to have smaller (or no) 
consequences for the operational scale. Symmetrically, the operational scale of certain 
public services can be changed radically without any amalgamation coming into play when 
intermunicipal cooperation is initiated. 
Intermunicipal cooperation introduces other aspects into the discussion as well. It allows 
municipalities to increase operational scale, reaping some of the benefits of economies of 
size that are more predictable for specific public services than for the local public services as 
a whole. Meanwhile, administrative scale remains unaffected, enabling a better reflection of 
local preferences in local government policy. A strong argument against intermunicipal 
cooperation is the introduction of an extra intermunicipal administration layer, which 
increases the distance between local government and public service production. According 
to agency theory, this might increase bureaucracy and inefficiency. Public choice theory 
instead suggests that the increased distance reduces political meddling which improves 
efficiency. 
Chapter 4 discusses our empirical research in this specific area of (in)efficiency caused by an 
increased distance between local government and the production of public services in the 
context of intermunicipal cooperation. We have taken a novel approach for this study. 
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Instead of focussing on a single public service and analysing efficiency effects by means of 
conventional methods for efficiency analysis, we focussed on the procurement of an 
resource that is needed for the production of a broad range of public services, namely credit. 
Using a micro-level dataset of loans to municipalities and intermunicipal organizations, we 
have been able to control for all variables that might affect negotiated interest rates for 
loans, leaving us with differences that can only be contributed to the negotiation effort put 
in by the borrowing party. 
We have found evidence that intermunicipal organizations pay higher interest rates for 
identical loans than municipalities do. This cannot be explained by differences in 
creditworthiness, as all loans in our dataset are risk free. These findings are robust for all 
types of loans that data is available for. The interest rates paid by intermunicipal 
organizations are 4% higher on average than those paid by municipalities. Newly 
amalgamated municipalities, however, do not pay higher interest rates than municipalities 
that have not been amalgamated in the recent past. 
Further analysis shows that the observed differences are not affected by the legal form of 
the intermunicipal organization (public body or public company), nor by the public service 
that is produced by the intermunicipal organization or by the number of municipalities that 
take part in the cooperation.  
Some crude calculations show that the amount of money that could be saved per loan by an 
intermunicipal organization would warrant more effort to be put into negotiations. The fact 
that this effort has not been made has led us to conclude that the existence of an extra 
administrative layer leads to inefficiency in the case of intermunicipal cooperation. This 
conclusion is in line with agency theory, which predicts that extra organizational layers 
among other things may reduce the level of monitoring by the principal which allows for 
suboptimal effort of the agent to optimize efficiency. 
Policy implications 
There is no reason to believe that our findings with regard to inefficiency caused by reduced 
monitoring should be limited only to the task of procuring credit. On the contrary, now that 
the hypothesis on inefficiency is supported by robust empirical evidence in this area, we 
would expect that reduced monitoring leads to inefficient behaviour in other parts of 
intermunicipal organizations as well. With our study, we have found support for a hypothesis 
that is the foundation of an important argument against intermunicipal cooperation: local 
politicians are bound to have less influence on the efficient delivery of public services if they 
decide to assign the task concerned to an intermunicipal organization. This does not mean 
that intermunicipal cooperation is undesirable in all cases. The arguments in favour of 
intermunicipal cooperation might be convincing enough to warrant such a decision. But it 
does underline that this efficiency effect is real and should not be underestimated or 
neglected by policymakers. 
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5.3 Avenues for further research 
Our research on municipal amalgamations and intermunicipal cooperation has added to the 
existing literature in a number of ways. We have used unique datasets that have allowed us 
to take steps in new directions and analyse effects using new approaches. However, as with 
all scientific research, we have found a number of avenues for further research which we 
have not been able to cover in the present work but could greatly help in finding more 
answers to the questions we have delved into. 
We have differentiated municipal amalgamations based on the population size after 
amalgamation and based on the differences in ideology of council and coalition before 
amalgamation. This is only a selection of possible criteria based on which amalgamations can 
show different effects on budgetary outcomes and efficiency. It is conceivable, for instance, 
that amalgamations are more likely to render efficiency gains when they are initiated fully 
voluntarily, and there is no external pressure whatsoever. Correspondingly, local public 
support for an amalgamation might be a factor of influence, not only ex post in terms of 
acceptance of policy changes and the valuation of public services, but also in terms of ex 
ante enthusiasm and support for approaching the preparations and the amalgamation 
process itself in a serious manner. Thirdly, the number of simultaneous amalgamations in 
the region or nation and the possibly associated guidance from higher level governments in 
the amalgamation process might positively affect outcomes in terms of efficiency. These 
criteria are worth exploring for a more detailed analysis of amalgamation effects. 
We have touched upon the issue of municipal efficiency and the way in which this is affected 
by amalgamation, using an approach of measuring capitalization of efficiency effects (or the 
lack thereof). Efficiency analysis is typically done using methods such as data envelopment 
analysis (DEA) or stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). The extent to which these methods are 
reliable and applicable depends heavily on the availability and quality of output indicators. 
For specific municipal tasks (e.g., waste disposal) these methods have been used thanks to 
the availability of this type of data. However, to measure municipal output as a whole and to 
produce reliable indicators that are comparable both over (a longer period of) time and 
between different municipalities has proven to be hard if not impossible. As an alternative 
approach, it would be interesting to see if data on credit procurement by municipalities is 
available on a microlevel for other countries(as it was to us for the research presented in 
chapter 4). If so, a comparison or combination with existing research on efficiency in waste 
management could provide a good opportunity for gaining insight in this topic. Also, to find 
out if our results found with interest rate differences can be translated to efficiency 
differences for the organizations in question, perhaps case studies aimed at obtaining a 
more complete view of the organizations involved could be fruitful. 
In our study on municipal amalgamation, we have mainly studied the effects on total 
spending of an increase of the administrative scale and with that a simultaneous increase of 
the operational scale for most public services (those that are not delivered at a supralocal 
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level). Although we have studied some specific categories of spending too, we have not yet 
delved into effects on specific categories of spending of increasing scale for specific tasks by 
means of intermunicipal cooperation. Ideally, this extension of the literature would combine 
effects of scaling up for several or all categories of spending, paying attention to possible 
synergy effects of intermunicipal organizations for different public services that share one or 
more municipalities.  
Hence, there are still many studies to be done with regard to the topic of optimal scale and 
size for local governments. With this thesis, I trust that we have taken the literature one 
small step further in the direction of a more definitive answer to the question what this 
optimal size might be (and under what conditions), but many steps still remain. 
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Een van de belangrijkte vraagstukken binnen het vakgebied van openbare financiën gaat 
over de optimale omvang van lagere overheden. Voor een groot aantal overheidstaken geldt 
dat de nationale overheid te groot is om deze op een efficiënte manier uit te voeren. Het ligt 
dan ook voor de hand dat de nationale overheid een aantal taken selecteert om door lagere 
overheden uit te laten voeren. Maar daar houdt de beleidsvrijheid van de overheid niet op: 
ook  herstructurering van lagere overheden (zowel van bovenaf als van onderop) kan grote 
veranderingen in de schaal waarop taken worden uitgevoerd tot gevolg hebben. Dit 
proefschrift bestudeert de gevolgen van verschillende vormen van dergelijke 
herstructurering. 
Aanleiding: lokale overheid in de praktijk 
Er zijn twee ontwikkelingen die aanleiding hebben gegeven tot de onderzoeken die ten 
grondslag liggen aan dit proefschrift. Ten eerste is er de constatering dat er grote verschillen 
zijn in de omvang van lokale overheden in verschillende landen. Zo hebben gemeenten in 
Tsjechië en Frankrijk gemiddeld minder dan 2.000 inwoners, terwijl die omvang in het 
Verenigd Koninkrijk rond 140.000 ligt. Het zou te makkelijk zijn om daarmee te concluderen 
dat er blijkbaar geen consensus over de optimale omvang van lokale overheden bestaat; 
deze verschillen kunnen immers ook in belangrijke mate bepaald zijn door historische 
ontwikkelingen in plaats van door recent beleid. We zien echter ook bij 
herindelingsoperaties in West-Europa in het verleden dat de resulterende gemeenten grote 
verschillen kennen in omvang. Het feit dat dus zelfs wanneer overheden vrij zijn om te 
bepalen hoe groot gemeenten ongeveer worden, zij niet ongeveer dezelfde omvang 
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nastreven, is een duidelijk indicatie van het feit dat er nog veel onduidelijkheid is over de 
optimale omvang van gemeenten.  
De tweede ontwikkeling die aanleiding geeft tot onderzoek naar herindeling en 
samenwerking betreft het beleid in Nederland ten aanzien van schaalvergroting. In 
Nederland zijn gemeentelijke herindelingen altijd aan de orde van de dag geweest. 
Geleidelijk aan is het aantal gemeenten tussen 1900 en 2015 door herindelingen afgenomen 
van 1.121 naar 393. Sinds 2002 is formeel vastgelegd dat brede publieke steun een 
belangrijke factor moet zijn bij beslissingen over het doorgaan van een gemeentelijke 
herindeling, waarmee het initiatief voor herindelingen kwam te liggen bij de betrokken 
gemeenten (of bij provincies die daarbij verplicht waren de wensen van de gemeenten 
zoveel mogelijk mee te nemen).  
Aan dat uitgangspunt kwam met het aantreden van het kabinet Rutte II een einde. In het 
regeerakkoord werden de ambities uitgesproken om door middel van decentralisaties het 
takenpakket van gemeenten te vergroten en tegelijkertijd de bestuurskracht van gemeenten 
te vergroten door aan te sturen op vergaande schaalvergroting. Uiteindelijk zouden 
gemeenten minimaal 100.000 inwoners moeten hebben, terwijl gemeenten in 2012 
gemiddeld ongeveer 40.000 inwoners hadden. Het aantal herindelingen per jaar zou 
daarvoor grofweg moeten worden verdubbeld, zo nodig op aangeven van de provincies. 
Omdat het kabinet ervan overtuigd was dat de gemeenten efficiënter zouden worden bij een 
grotere omvang, werd op lange termijn een structurele korting op het gemeentefonds van 1 
miljard euro per jaar ingecalculeerd, wat neer zou komen op een reductie van ongeveer 6%. 
Blijkbaar wordt door nationale overheden (in elk geval door de Nederlandse) soms 
aangestuurd op schaalvergroting door herindeling op basis van verwachte efficiencywinst, 
terwijl het internationale beeld niet wijst op een consensus over de meest efficiënte omvang 
van gemeenten. Daarmee is het belang van een verdergaand debat over dit onderwerp 
geschets, waarbij economisch onderzoek zowel in theoretisch als in empirisch opzicht een 
belangrijke rol kan spelen. 
De theorie over de optimale omvang van gemeenten 
Theoretisch gezien is de optimale omvang van gemeenten die omvang waarbij de efficiency 
van die gemeenten optimaal is, zodat er sprake van een nutsmaximalisatie. Van die 
efficiency worden in de theorie twee typen onderscheiden: productieve en allocatieve 
efficiency. 
Productieve efficiency  
Bij productieve efficiency gaat het om de vraag hoe een bepaalde productie-eenheid (in dit 
geval: een gemeente) gegeven een bepaalde input (o.a. het gemeentelijke budget) optimaal 
kan produceren (diensten kan leveren), of hoe een bepaalde productie tegen zo laag 
mogelijke input geleverd kan worden. De omvang van een gemeente kan dit type efficiency 
op een aantal manieren beïnvloeden, zowel positief als negatief. 
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Ten eerste kunnen ambtenaren in grotere gemeentelijke organisaties meer expertise 
opbouwen, omdat zij in de regel een kleiner takenpakket zullen hebben. Deze mogelijkheid 
tot specialisatie verhoogt de individuele efficiency en daarmee die van de organisatie als 
geheel. Een tweede efficiencyvoordeel ligt in het feit dat niet alle gemeentelijke kosten naar 
rato meegroeien met de omvang van een gemeente. Zo zal het gemeentehuis van een 
gemeente met 100.000 inwoners niet twee maal zo groot zijn als in een gemeente met 
50.000 inwoners, en ook het aantal raadsleden per inwoner is kleiner bij grotere gemeenten. 
Grotere gemeenten hebben een betere onderhandelingspositie bij inkoop van goederen en 
diensten en kunnen daardoor efficienter werken. Het vierde effect heeft te maken met 
toevallige  gebeurtenissen waar politici geen invloed op hebben maar die wel een wezenlijke 
invloed op herverkiezing van politici kunnen hebben. Dergelijke gebeurtenissen ondermijnen 
verantwoordingsmechanismen in het lokaal bestuur. De kans hierop is naar verwachting 
kleiner in grotere gemeenten, waardoor die ook op dit punt efficiencyvoordeel hebben. 
Productieve efficiency kan ook negatief beïnvloed worden door de omvang van de 
gemeente. Ten eerste  kunnen de kosten om informatie binnen een organisatie over te 
brengen naar rato of zelfs exponentieel groeien met de omvang van die organisatie. 
Daarnaast kunnen bij grotere organisaties de coördinatie- en communicatiekosten naar 
verhouding hoger zijn. Bij grotere gemeenten zullen meer schakels in een organisatie 
betrokken zijn bij het vertalen van wensen van de inwoners naar gemeentelijke 
dienstverlening, terwijl bij elke schakel ruis kan ontstaan bij deze vertaling. Daarbij kunnen 
ook de persoonlijke voorkeuren van ambtenaren een rol gaan spelen: er zijn theoriën die 
voorspellen dat deze een belang hebben om hun eigen budget (of dat van hun organisatie-
eenheid) te maximaliseren. Hoe meer ambtenaren betrokken zijn, hoe sterker dit effect 
negatieve invloed op de efficiency kan uitoefenen. 
Wanneer binnen een land de gemeenten gemiddeld groter zijn, betekent dat ook dat er 
minder gemeenten zijn. Ook dit is van invloed op de efficiency van gemeenten. Kiezers 
kunnen namelijk de prestaties van hun gemeente beoordelen door middel van vergelijking 
met andere gemeenten. Wanneer er minder gemeenten zijn, zullen er ook minder 
vergelijkbare gemeenten zijn, waardoor de kiezer minder goed kan beoordelen hoe goed zijn 
eigen gemeente functioneert. Hierdoor vermindert de controle van de kiezer op het lokaal 
bestuur, dat minder geprikkeld zal zijn om efficiency na te streven. Deze verminderde 
maatstafconcurrentie en daarmee gepaard gaande verminderde efficiency is een indirect 
gevolg van het groter maken van gemeenten binnen een bepaald gebied. 
Allocatieve efficiency 
In de context van gemeenten spreken we over maximale allocatieve efficiency wanneer de 
samenstelling en kwaliteit van de publieke dienstverlening precies overeenkomt met de 
wensen van het publiek. Ook hierop kan de omvang van gemeenten van positieve of 
negatieve invloed zijn.  
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Het voornaamste argument in dit opzicht tegen grotere gemeenten is dat het in deze 
gemeenten relatief moeilijk is om als kiezer de voorkeur door te laten klinken in het lokale 
beleid. In grotere gemeenten is het voor bestuurders makkelijker om een 
informatievoorsprong te verkrijgen, waardoor het voor inwoners moeilijker is om erachter te 
komen wanneer bestuurders niet optimaal hun wensen vertalen naar beleid. Zelfs als er een 
aantal inwoners is dat wel voldoende toegang tot informatie heeft om het presteren van 
bestuurders op waarde te schatten, zal dit aantal naar verwachting in grotere gemeentes 
relatief klein zijn ten opzichte van het totale electoraat. In grotere gemeentes worden 
bestuurders dus minder goed gecorrigeerd wanneer zij hun taak als vertaler van wensen van 
de kiezer naar publieke dienstverlening niet goed vervullen. 
Ook het Oates decentralisatie theorema is in dit opzicht relevant. Dit theorema stelt dat 
taken zo ver mogelijk gedecentraliseerd moeten worden, zolang de opbrengsten opwegen 
tegen de kosten. De kosten zijn hierbij tweeledig: ten eerste wijst Oates op het wegvallen 
van schaalvoordelen ten aanzien van productieve efficiency, ten tweede zijn externaliteiten 
groter bij vergaande decentralisaties (daarover later meer). De opbrengsten spelen ten 
aanzien van allocatieve efficiency: decentralisatie van taken naar lokaal niveau creëert de 
mogelijkheid om meer variatie aan te brengen in publieke dienstverlening, ervan uitgaande 
dat in verschillende gemeenten ook verschillende wensen spelen. Hoe groter echter de 
gemeenten, hoe minder die mogelijkheid optimaal benut kan worden. Daarmee is de 
omvang van een gemeente dus van negatieve invloed op allocatieve efficiency. Bij grotere 
gemeenten valt er minder te kiezen voor de burger: de kans zal kleiner zijn dat hij naar een 
gemeente zou kunnen verhuizen waar de publieke dienstverlening dicht bij zijn voorkeuren 
ligt wanneer er keus is uit minder gemeenten. 
Een belangrijk voordeel van grotere gemeenten is de verkleining van zogenaamde 
overloopeffecten. Vaak moeten lokale politici beslissingen maken die ook gevolgen kunnen 
hebben op het welzijn buiten hun eigen gemeente, zowel positief als negatief. Deze 
gevolgen zullen niet of nauwelijks worden meegenomen door politici: de inwoners van hun 
buurgemeenten kunnen hen immers nauwelijks belonen of afstraffen voor de genomen 
beslissen. Hierdoor worden deze effecten buiten de eigen jurisdictie (externaliteiten) 
onvoldoende meegenomen waardoor het nut in het totale gebied waar de gevolgen 
neerslaan zijn niet gemaximaliseerd wordt. Dit fenomeen wordt echter zwakker wanneer de 
gemeenten groter worden en daarmee de externaliteiten kleiner. De allocatieve efficiency 
wordt dus in dit opzicht groter met de gemeenteomvang. 
Aanvullende theoretische complicaties 
Al met al kan dus worden gesteld dat de gemeentegrootte zowel ten aanzien van 
productieve efficiency als ten aanzien van allocatieve efficiency positieve en negatieve 
theoretische effecten kan hebben. Het is vanuit de theorie niet mogelijk om te beredeneren 
welke effecten sterker zijn voor gemeenten van een bepaalde omvang. Het is wel duidelijk 
dat schaalvoordelen vooral van toepassing zijn bij kleine gemeenten, terwijl schaalnadelen 
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een prominentere rol spelen bij grote gemeenten. Hier volgt de conclusie uit dat er in 
theorie een optimale omvang voor gemeenten zou kunnen bestaan: op dit punt zouden de 
schaalnadelen de overhand krijgen boven de schaalvoordelen en zou het niet meer lonen 
een grotere omvang te hebben. 
Ook daarbij kunnen vraagtekens worden gezet. Een lokale overheid levert immers meerdere 
diensten  en kent meerdere productieprocessen die elk een eigen optimale schaal hebben. 
Om de optimale schaal  van een gemeente te berekenen moet worden bekeken of en hoe 
die verschillende optimale schalen gecombineerd kunnen worden. Ook hiervoor geeft de 
theorie geen uitsluitsel. 
Een volgende complicatie betreft het feit dat gemeentelijke organisaties er niet aan 
gehouden hun productieprocessen op gemeentelijke schaal uit te voeren. Ze kunnen ervoor 
kiezen om met andere gemeenten samen te werken bij het leveren van bepaalde diensten, 
of om bepaalde diensten uit te besteden aan bedrijven die daarmee op grotere schaal 
kunnen opereren. Het feit dat verschillende diensten op verschillende schaalgroottes 
kunnen worden uitgevoerd en dat deze schalen niet overeen hoeven te komen met de 
omvang van de gemeente zelf, is van invloed op de vraag hoe groot die gemeente dan zou 
moeten zijn. Datzelfde geldt voor de mogelijke invloed die samenwerkingspartners en 
leveranciers op het lokale bestuur kunnen uitoefenen (wordt beleid geüniformeerd?) en de 
effecten van extra schakels in de keten wanneer een derde partij namens een gemeente 
diensten verleent aan de bevolking op allocatieve efficiency. 
Effecten van herindelingen op het lokaal bestuur 
Tot nu toe hebben we het gehad over de optimale omvang van gemeenten. Dat is van groot 
belang bij het behandelen van het onderwerp gemeentelijke herindeling, omdat het 
belangrijkste gevolg van zo’n herindeling is dat de omvang van de betrokken gemeenten 
aanzienlijk toeneemt. Maar er is ook een aantal effecten van herindeling die niet zozeer met 
de verandering in omvang te maken hebben, maar wel invloed kunnen hebben op het lokaal 
bestuur.  
Er zijn twee nadelige effecten die op korte termijn relevant zijn denkbaar. Allereerst is het 
zogenaamde ‘common pool’-effect van belang. Dit houdt in dat lokale besturen bij een 
aanstaande herindeling geneigd zullen zijn om voor dat het zover is nog bestaande reserves 
snel uit te geven aan zaken die vooral de eigen gemeente baten, voordat alles in de 
gezamenlijke pot terecht komt. Dergelijke uitgaven zouden zelfs gefinancierd kunnen 
worden door leningen aan te gaan, die na de herindeling door de nieuwe gemeente zal 
moeten worden afgelost. Een tweede effect betreft de ambtelijke reorganisatie: 
onzekerheid onder het personeel kan leiden tot focus op de eigen carrière, uitdiensttreding 
en een verslechterde werksfeer, terwijl strategische beslissingen mogelijk worden uitgesteld 
tot na de herindeling. 
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De reorganisatie kan ook een positief, structureel effect hebben. Doordat organisaties 
samengevoegd worden ontstaan kansen om de huidige, mogelijk ingesleten werkwijzen door 
te lichten, van elkaar te leren en eventueel geheel nieuwe, efficiente processen op te zetten.  
De noodzaak van empirisch onderzoek en de rol van dit proefschrift 
Samengevat zien we dat in de praktijk het gevoerde beleid op gemeentelijke schaal 
internationaal geen uitsluitsel geeft over wat hierin optimaal is. Toch zien we regelmatig 
herstructureringsoperaties die een schaalvergroting beogen, waarbij vaak – ook in 
Nederland – financiële prikkels een rol spelen op basis van de aanname dat daarbij 
efficiencywinst te behalen valt. Theoretisch is er voor die  aanname geen basis te vinden: ten 
aanzien van zowel productieve als allocatieve efficiency kunnen positieve én negatieve 
effecten optreden, die door een aantal complicerende factoren slecht voorspelbaar zijn op 
basis van theorie alleen. Empirisch onderzoek is nodig om meer inzicht in dit onderwerp te 
krijgen. 
Dit proefschrift presenteert de resultaten van twee empirische onderzoeken over twee 
instrumenten die gebruikt worden om de schaal van gemeentelijke dienstverlening te 
vergroten: gemeentelijke herindeling en intergemeentelijke samenwerking. Het derde 
instrument, uitbesteding van overheidsdiensten, valt buiten de scope van het proefschrift. 
De economische effecten van gemeentelijke herindeling 
Het meest rigoureuze instrument dat beleidsmakers hebben om schaal en omvang van 
gemeenten te beïnvloeden is de gemeentelijke herindeling. Door samenvoeging van 
meerdere gemeenten neemt de omvang van de betrokken gemeenten plotsklaps enorm toe. 
In veel landen is dit instrument de laatste tientallen jaren ingezet, waarbij vaak is gekozen 
voor een zogenaamde ‘big bang’-benadering, waarbij een groot aantal gemeentelijke 
herindelingen tegelijk plaatsvindt op aangeven van een centrale overheid. Zoals gezegd zijn 
er verschillende effecten van schaal op efficiency van gemeentes en is de algehele conclusie 
uit de theorie dat niet valt te voorspellen wanneer welke effecten optreden en hoe sterk die 
ten opzichte van elkaar zijn.  
Het is dan ook geen verrassing dat de uitkomsten van empirisch onderzoek naar dit 
onderwerp uiteenlopende conclusies opleveren. Uit een aantal onderzoeken blijkt dat de 
gemeentelijke uitgaven na een herindeling stijgen (in Zwitserland, Denemarken en Finland), 
terwijl andere onderzoeken het tegendeel uitwijzen (in Israël en Duitsland). Ook voor het 
zogenaamde ‘common pool’-effect is door een aantal onderzoekers bewijs gevonden (in 
Denemarken, Zweden en Finland).  
De hoofdstukken 2 en 3 presenteren ons onderzoek over dit onderwerp. Het onderzoek 
biedt toegevoegde waarde ten opzichte van de bestaande literatuur op het gebied van zowel 
de gebruikte data als ingezette methodologie. Waar onderzoekers onderzoeken tot nog toe 
ofwel een beperkt aantal losse gevallen bestudeerden of onderzoek deden naar een ‘big 
bang’-herindelingsoperatie, bestuderen  wij herindelingen in Nederland gedurende een 
Samenvatting  109 
 
langere periode, waarbij in bijna elk jaar een aantal gemeenten (bijna) heringedeeld werd. 
Deze unieke dataset stelt ons in staat om het effect van herindelingen op een optimale wijze 
te isoleren van andere tijdelijke factoren die van invloed kunnen zijn op lokale 
overheidsfinanciën. Daarbij introduceren we in dit onderzoeksgebied een dynamische panel 
data analyse en gebruiken we een aantal robuustheidstesten waarbij we onder andere 
ruimtelijke effecten meenemen. 
De uitkomst van dit onderzoek is dat er geen robuust bewijs te vinden is voor het bestaan 
van herindelingseffecten, noch voor noch na herindeling. Deze bevindingen houden stand 
wanneer we herindelingen met een dominante herindelingspartner meenemen, of 
alternatieve herindelingsdummy’s of controlevariabelen gebruiken. Ook wanneer we een 
andere onderzoeksopzet kiezen op basis van instrumentele variabelen of een ruimtelijk 
dynamisch panel model, blijven de bevindingen overeind. Een significant herindelingseffect 
blijft niet alleen uit bij gemeentelijke uitgaven, maar ook bij gemeentelijke schuld, betaalde 
lonen, het aantal ambtenaren in de organisatie en bij ozb-inkomsten.  
In hoofdstuk 3 presenteren we een uitgebreidere analyse van deze bevindingen waarbij we 
een aantal mogelijke verklaringen voor het ontbreken van een herindelingseffect 
onderzoeken. Zo is het denkbaar dat het niet vinden van een herindelingseffect het gevolg is 
van het feit dat we alle gemeenten als een groep hebben bestudeerd. Het kan zijn dat er 
voor verschillende subgroepen verschillende herindelingseffecten bestaan die in 
tegengestelde richting werken waardoor ze tegen elkaar wegvallen bij een analyse van alle 
gemeente samen. Zo is de verwachting dat bij kleine gemeenten schaalvoordelen zwaarder 
wegen dan schaalnadelen, terwijl dat bij grote gemeenten andersom is. De resultaten van 
nieuwe analyses, waarbij we de herindelingsdummy laten interacteren met de bevolking van 
de gemeente, wijzen echter niet op significant bewijs voor deze verwachting. Een tweede 
hypothese is dat bij gemeenten die samengaan en grote politieke verschillen kennen, de 
toename in uitgaven om alle partijen tevreden te stellen groter zal zijn dan eventuele 
efficiencyvoordelen waarmee uitgaven per saldo zouden groeien. Bij meer gelijkgestemde 
gemeenten zouden de efficiencyvoordelen juist overheersen. Ook voor deze hypothese 
vinden we echter geen bewijs in aanvullende analyses. 
De tweede uitbreiding van de basisstudie in hoofdstuk 2 gaat in op de mogelijke kritiek dat 
de belangrijkste afhankelijke variabele in deze studie niet een goede maat is voor de 
efficiency van een gemeente. Het is immers denkbaar dat er wel degelijk schaalvoordelen 
optreden, maar dat deze niet zichtbaar zijn in de gemeentelijke uitgaven omdat de nieuwe 
gemeente de efficiencywinst inzet om de publieke dienstverlening te verbeteren. Dit 
scenario hebben we op twee manieren onderzocht. Ten eerste hebben we bekeken of er 
wellicht herindelingseffecten zijn te vinden in uitgaven waar specifiek efficiencyvoordelen te 
verwachten zijn (bestuurslasten) en in uitgaven waarvan de resultaten in relatief sterke mate 
zichtbaar zijn voor de inwoners van de gemeente (cultuur en recreatie). We vinden wel een 
afname in de eerste categore uitgaven, maar geen effect bij de tweede categorie. Als 
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tweede benadering kijken we naar de ontwikkeling in huizenprijzen binnen 
herindelingsgemeenten. Op basis van het mechanisme kapitalisatie, dat impliceert dat 
gemeenten die efficienter zijn ook aantrekkelijker zijn om in te wonen, zou een herindeling 
met efficiencywinst moeten leiden tot hogere huizenprijzen. Ook bij bestudering van deze 
variabele zien we echter geen herindelingseffect, waarmee we concluderen dat er geen 
bewijs is voor het idee dat efficiencyvoordelen worden ingezet voor verbetering van de 
gemeentelijke dienstverlening.  
Over het geheel bezien vinden we dus, afgezien van een klein neerwaarts effect op uitgaven 
aan bestuurslasten dat dermate klein is dat het verwatert bij analyse van de totale uitgaven, 
geen significant, robuust bewijs voor het bestaan van een herindelingseffect, noch bij 
uitgaven, noch bij dienstverlening van gemeenten. 
Gevolgen voor het beleid 
We hebben gezien dat het kabinet Rutte II heeft ingezet op het stimuleren van 
gemeentelijke herindelingen. Dit beleid is niet alleen ingegeven door de verwachting dat dit 
financiëel voordelig zou zijn. Als voornaamste reden is opgegeven dat de ambitie is ontstaan 
om de bestuurskracht van gemeenten te vergroten, ook met het oog op het verzwaarde 
takenpakket na de decentralisaties in het sociale domein. Toch zijn er ook substantiële 
efficiencywinst ingecalculeerd én begroot voor de (middel)lange termijn. 
Wij vinden echter geen empirisch bewijs wat de verwachtingen ten aanzien van deze 
efficiencywinsten kan ondersteunen. We concluderen daarmee dat het af te raden is om aan 
te sturen op herindelingen om financiële redenen. Het kan zo zijn dat herindelingen 
wenselijk zijn om andere redenen, maar men kan daarbij niet zonder meer van 
efficiencywinst uitgaan. De herindelingen die wij hebben bestudeerd konden in de regel op 
brede publieke steun rekenen, ofwel omdat ze het resultaat waren van een bottom up-
proces, ofwel omdat er sterk rekening werd gehouden met de voorkeuren van het lokale 
bestuur. Dit betekent dat onze conclusies nog relevanter zijn voor beleid waarbij druk van 
bovenaf wordt uitgeoefend om herindelingen te bewerkstelligen. Gemeenten die hierbij 
betrokken zijn zullen immers minder gemotiveerd zijn het maximale resultaat uit hun 
herindeling te halen, wat de kansen op efficiencywinst verder verkleint. 
Intergemeentelijke samenwerking 
Zoals gezegd kan intergemeentelijke samenwerking een belangrijke rol spelen bij de 
discussie over de optimale omvang van een gemeente (of de bandbreedte daarvoor). 
Immers, wanneer bepaalde overheidsdienstverlening niet op het niveau van de gemeente is 
geregeld, maar op het niveau van een samenwerkingsverband of een groep gemeenten, dan 
heeft een herindeling minder grote (of geen) gevolgen voor de efficiency op dat gebied. 
Evenzo kan de operationele schaal van bepaalde publieke diensten ingrijpend veranderen 
zonder dat een herindeling hierin een rol speelt. 
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Doordat gemeentebesturen de optie hebben om bepaalde publieke taken op 
intergemeentelijk niveau uit te laten voeren, bestaat de mogelijkheid om specifiek 
schaalvoordelen te halen op een gedeelte van het takenpakket, zonder de bestuurlijke 
schaal te vergroten en de afstand tussen bestuur en bewoners aan te tasten voor de lokale 
overheid als geheel. Toch kan voor de intergemeentelijk geregelde taken door het 
introduceren van een extra bestuurslaag wel sprake zijn van verminderde grip van het lokale 
bestuur op deze processen. Volgens de agency theroy kan dit leiden tot meer bureaucratie 
en inefficiency. Aan de andere kant suggereert de public choice theory  juist dat deze extra 
bestuurslaag ervoor zorgt dat er minder politieke belangen in de sturing kunnen worden 
gemengd, wat de efficiency juist ten goede zou komen. 
In hoofstuk 4 bespreken we ons empirisch onderzoek naar de effecten van 
intergemeentelijke samenwerking op efficiency als gevolg van deze vergrote afstand tussen 
publieke dienstverlening en lokaal bestuur. Hiervoor maken we gebruik van een innovatieve 
methode. Normaal gesproken wordt gekeken naar een bepaalde overheidsdienst 
(bijvoorbeeld afvalverwerking) en worden conventionele efficiency-analyse-methoden 
hierop toegepast. Wij hebben onze focus gelegd op de inkoop van een input die gebruikt 
wordt bij de productie van een breed scala aan overheidsdiensten: krediet. We maken 
gebruik van een dataset van losse leningen aan gemeenten en intergemeentelijke 
organisaties, waarin alle eigenschappen die de hoogte van de toegepaste rente zouden 
kunnen beïnvloeden zijn opgenomen. Daarmee kunnen we het effect van de inzet op 
onderhandelingen door de lener isoleren: als een hogere rente wordt betaald voor een 
identieke lening, dan moet dat het gevolg zijn van een kleinere inspanning door de lener om 
een goede rente te onderhandelen. 
Op basis van deze methode vinden we dat intergemeentelijke organisaties hogere rentes 
betalen dan gemeenten voor verder identieke leningen. Dit verschil kan niet verklaard 
worden verschillen in kredietwaardigheid, aangezien leningen in beide gevallen volledig 
zonder risico zijn. Dit verschil zien we bij alle typen leningen in onze dataset. Tegelijkertijd 
zien we dit effect juist niet bij net heringedeelde gemeenten: zij lenen tegen gelijke 
rentetarieven als langer bestaande gemeenten. Deze uitkomsten worden niet beïnvloed 
door het soort organisatie (openbaar lichaam of overheidsbedrijf) of de overheidstaak die 
door de intergemeentelijke organisatie wordt uitgevoerd. 
Gemiddeld betalen intergemeentelijke organisaties 4 procent meer aan rentekosten voor 
identieke leningen dan gemeenten. Op basis van een aantal simpele berekeningen valt snel 
te achterhalen dat het voor deze organisaties zeker zou lonen om meer inspanning te 
leveren bij onderhandelingen om een goede rente. Het feit dat dit niet gebeurt doet ons 
concluderen dat het bestaan van een extra bestuurslaag tot inefficiency leidt. Deze conclusie 
is daarmee in lijn met de agency theory die voorspelt dat er ruimte ontstaat voor inefficiency 
door verminderd toezicht vanuit het lokaal bestuur. 
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Gevolgen voor het beleid 
Er is geen reden om ervan uit te gaan dat onze conclusies over de inkoop van kredit niet 
toepasbaar zouden zijn op het functioneren van intergemeentelijke 
samenwerkingsverbanden in bredere zin. Ons onderzoek ondersteunt de hypothese die aan 
de basis staat van een belangrijk argument tegen intergemeentelijke samenwerking: lokale 
politici zullen naar verwachting minder kunnen sturen op de efficiënte levering van publieke 
diensten wanneer ze de uitvoering ervan beleggen bij een intergemeentelijke organisatie. 
Dit betekent niet automatisch dat intergemeentelijke samenwerking onder geen beding een 
goede keuze is: er kunnen andere argumenten zijn om hier wel toe over te gaan. Maar het 
potentiële efficiencyverlies is ontegenzeggelijk een reëel risico dat niet onderschat of 
genegeerd kan worden door beleidsmakers. 
Mogelijk vervolgonderzoek 
Ons onderzoek is op een aantal manieren van toegevoegde waarde geweest voor de 
bestaande literatuur. We hebben gebruik gemaakt van unieke datasets waarmee we in staat 
zijn gesteld om nieuwe benaderingen te kiezen bij de analyse van effecten van herindeling 
en samenwerking. Er is echter, zoals altijd bij wetenschappelijk onderzoek, ook nog een 
aantal mogelijkheden om deze onderwerpen nader te bestuderen. 
We hebben bij het bestuderen van herindelingen onderscheid gemaakt tussen grote en 
kleine gemeenten, en tussen gemeenten met grote en kleine ideologische verschillen. Dat is 
maar een selectie uit de mogelijke factoren die van invloed kunnen zijn op het ontstaan van 
herindelingseffecten. Zo zou onderscheid gemaakt kunnen worden op basis van de mate 
waarin een herindeling is opgelegd door een hogere overheid. Volledig vrijwillig 
herindelende gemeenten zullen meer gemotiveerd zijn om het maximale uit een herindeling 
te halen dan gemeenten die daartoe gedwongen zijn. Ook de steun bij de bevolking kan van 
invloed zijn, niet alleen bij de waardering voor dienstverlening door de overheid na de 
herindeling, maar ook bij de voorbereidingen op een aanstaande herindeling. Ten derde zou 
nog gekeken kunnen worden naar gelijktijdige herindelingen in de regio en mogelijk 
daarmee gepaard gaande begeleiding vanuit hogere overheidslagen. Het is 
aanbevelenswaardig om deze factoren nader te bekijken om meer inzicht te krijgen in het 
bestaan van mogelijke herindelingseffecten. 
We hebben het onderwerp gemeentelijke efficiency bij herindelingen onderzocht door te 
kijken naar de mogelijke kapitalisatie van efficiency effecten en de ontwikkeling van 
huizenprijzen. Het is gebruikelijk dat bij bestudering van efficiency gebruik wordt gemaakt 
van data envelopment analysis of stochastic frontier analysis. De toepasbaarheid en 
bruikbaarheid van deze methoden valt of staat bij de beschikbaarheid en kwaliteit van 
gegevens over de output van gemeenten. Voor een aantal publieke taken (zoals 
afvalverwerking) zijn dergelijke gegevens beschikbaar en zijn deze methoden dan ook 
gebruikt bij studies in meerdere landen. Voor de output van gemeenten als geheel, over het 
gehele scala aan overheidstaken, zijn de gegevens echter ontoereikend gebleken. Het is wel 
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het onderzoeken waard om te kijken of er in het buitenland vergelijkbare datasets van 
leningen zijn zoals de onze, om vervolgens vergelijkbare analyses uit te voeren met deze 
data. De uitkomsten van deze studies en die over specifieke taken zoals afvalverwerking 
kunnen dan naast elkaar gelegd worden om meer inzicht in dit onderwerp te verkrijgen. Ook 
zou het de moeite kunnen lonen om onze bevindingen op het gebied van inefficiency bij 
intergemeentelijke organisaties te toetsen door middel van casestudy’s die een meer 
compleet beeld kunnen verschaffen. 
Ons onderzoek naar gemeentelijke herindelingen is voornamelijk gericht geweest op de 
gevolgen voor totale gemeentelijke uitgaven van een toename van zowel de bestuurlijke 
schaal als de operationele schaal waarop de uitvoering van meeste (niet elders belegde) 
overheidstaken geschiedt. We hebben nog niet gekeken naar de effecten van de opschaling 
van bepaalde taken (door intergemeentelijke samenwerking) op bepaalde 
uitgavencategorieën van gemeenten. Idealiter zou men dan ook kunnen kijken naar 
synergie-effecten wanneer meerdere taken tegelijk bij samenwerkingsverbanden worden 
belegd.  
Kortom, er is nog veel onderzoekswerk te verrichten over het onderwerp van de optimale 
schaal en omvang van gemeenten. Ik vertrouw erop dat we met dit proefschrift een nieuwe, 
kleine stap hebben gezet in de richting van een definitief antwoord op de vraag wat die 
optimale omvang zou kunnen zijn (en onder welke omstandigheden), maar er zijn nog veel 
(en grote) stappen nodig. 
  
 
